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I. INTRODUCTION 
The practice of tax law is fundamentally the practice of statutory 
interpretation.  For the most part, though, the scholarly tax 
community has been relatively indifferent to the work of our 
colleagues who teach and write in the realm of interpretative theory.1  
One area in which this oversight is becoming increasingly apparent is 
in our efforts to grapple with the policy challenge offered by the tax 
shelter industry. 
In recent years tax shelter regulation has been complicated by the 
fact that the government’s litigation tools for combating shelters 
derive from a different era in the intellectual history of the judicial 
interpretation of statutes.2  The foremost of these tools, the “economic 
substance doctrine,” is a common law rule3 crafted by a Supreme 
Court4 that was entirely comfortable saying of another tax statute that 
“[l]ife in all its fullness must supply” the best interpretation.5  That is 
not our Court, and it often is not our lower federal courts, either.  We 
live in an era in which textualism — loosely conceived as fidelity to 
 1 For some notable exceptions, see Deborah A. Geier, Textualism and Tax 
Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 445 (1993); Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, 
“Purposivism,” and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677 (1996); 
Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the 
Interpretation of Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819 (1991); Edward J. McCaffery, Tax’s 
Empire, 85 GEO. L.J. 71 (1996); Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral 
Interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 623 (1986).  There are 
only a few brief efforts in the tax shelter arena.  See Joseph Bankman, The Economic 
Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 11–14 (2000); Robert Thornton Smith, 
Business Purpose: The Assault upon the Citadel, 53 TAX LAW. 1, 14–20 (1999).  
Another important article, Noël B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and 
Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2004), includes a discussion on the place of 
legislative history in tax interpretation, id. at 7–19, a subject I set to one side here, as a 
prelude to its insightful discussion of administrative law principles underlying the 
Internal Revenue Service’s (Service) partnership anti-abuse regulations, id. at 32–61. 
 2 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 2. 
 3 Bankman, supra note 1, at 7–11. 
 4 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
 5 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114–15 (1933). 
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the words of the statute — now reigns over the more free-wheeling 
methods of Cardozo and Holmes.6
Thus, we now see decisions in which courts read the economic 
substance doctrine narrowly, if they are willing to apply it at all.7  We 
can only guess at what goes on in the minds of other tax planners, but 
this development almost certainly has to have made a difference in the 
way that lawyers and others think about how to arrange their affairs.8  
In addition to the “audit lottery,” we now have a sort of “textualist 
lottery.”9  Even Knetsch, tax law’s most famous economic substance 
loser,10 might try his deal with the Sam Houston Company again in 
today’s climate; one never knows when a court will decide that the 
literal words of a statute are as far as it need go in deciding the tax 
treatment of any transaction.  Early defense filings in the prosecution 
of the KPMG shelter promoters suggest that this exact dynamic may 
 6 See Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes: Interpretive Regimes, 38 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1909, 1911 (2005) (summarizing empirical study analyzing Supreme Court’s use 
of interpretive methods).  For a study of the Supreme Court’s historical practices, see 
Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical 
Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1091–113 (1992).
 7 See infra note 26.  Of course, the Government has also won in some cases in 
which taxpayers raised textualist arguments, most prominently in a recent case in the 
Federal Circuit.  Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 
2006); ACM P’ship v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231, 247–63 (3d Cir. 1998).  My claim 
here is not that textualism inevitably will prevail in all litigated cases, only that it is 
likely at least to succeed often enough to impact tax planning.  For example, the 
occasional textualist opinion may reduce the potential downside to tax planning.  A 
taxpayer is generally safe from both civil and criminal penalties if she relies upon tax 
advice with “substantial authority” to support it.  See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 
192, 201 (1991) (holding that defendant cannot be guilty of tax offense unless he 
intentionally violates a known legal duty); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(a), (d) (2005) 
(defining standard for civil penalties).  Whether authority is “substantial” is a 
balancing test, and is “less stringent than the more likely than not standard,” Treas. 
Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2), (3), such that, while a single textualist opinion might be 
insufficient authority, a series of them, might well be enough to encourage taxpayers 
to rely on a textualist position with the hopes of, at worst, a loss with no penalties. 
 8 Joseph Bankman, Tax Enforcement: Tax Shelters, the Cash Economy, and 
Compliance Costs, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005); Cunningham & Repetti, supra 
note 1, at 4, 27–28; Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The 
Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 
361 (2002). 
 9 Cf. Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the 
Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1947 (2005) (arguing that, in 
addition to audit lottery, taxpayers also may gamble that they will prevail in court by 
denying applicability of economic substance doctrine). 
 10 Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960). 
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be at the heart of the defendants’ case: how could they have “known” 
that the shelters they offered were contrary to a “legal duty,” when it 
was possible that some textualist court would support their tax claims 
irrespective of their transactions’ total lack of economic substance?11
Other commentators have recognized the importance of the 
textualist revolution for the shelter problem.12  Many have noted that 
judicial reluctance to invoke the common law methods of yore may 
oblige Congress to codify some of the doctrines, such as economic 
substance, that courts have in the past used to combat abusive tax 
avoidance (whatever “abusive” may mean).13  Indeed, both the Senate 
and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) have proposed codified 
versions of the economic substance doctrine, although apparently 
Treasury is not enthusiastic.14  Textualism is an elephant in the room 
in an important scholarly alternative to the JCT’s proposal, set out in 
a recent Columbia Law Review essay by Marvin Chirelstein and Larry 
Zelenak.15  Chirelstein and Zelenak urge us, in essence, to abandon 
hope in economic substance and instead to pursue a pair of bright-line 
rules designed to cut off what they see as the most damaging forms of 
modern shelters.16  All of these efforts are thorough, carefully 
considered, and draw on far more real-world tax experience than is 
available to this author. 
 11 Memorandum of Law in Support of Certain Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss 
the Charging Portions of the Indictment Involving FLIP, OPIS and BLIPS on the 
Ground that the Prosecutors Misled and Misinformed the Grand Jury Concerning the 
Applicable Law and Material Facts, United States v. Stein, No. 05-CR-0888 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 12, 2006). 
 12 Bankman, supra note 8, at 3–5; Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 27–
29; Allen D. Madison, The Tension Between Textualism and Substance-over-Form 
Doctrines in Tax Law, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699, 747–48 (2003). 
 13 See Ellen P. Aprill, Tax Shelters, Tax Law, and Morality: Codifying Judicial 
Doctrines, 54 SMU L. REV. 9, 34 (2001); Martin J. McMahon Jr., Beyond a GAAR: 
Retrofitting the Code To Rein in 21st Century Tax Shelters, 98 TAX NOTES 1721, 1734–
37 (Mar. 17, 2003); Lee A. Sheppard, Drafting Economic Substance, Part 3, 106 TAX 
NOTES 1020, 1025 (Feb. 28, 2005). 
 14 For the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) proposal, see STAFF OF JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND 
REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES (Joint Comm. Print 2005).  For the Senate’s bill, see, 
e.g., Tax Shelter and Tax Haven Reform Act of 2005, S. 1565, 109th Cong. § 301.  On 
Treasury’s coolness to these types of proposals, see, e.g., Nomination of Pamela F. 
Olson: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 107th Cong. (2002); Sheryl 
Stratton, Shelter Disclosure, Doctrine Codification Debated, 99 TAX NOTES 25, 25 
(Apr. 7, 2003) (reporting views of Treasury officials). 
 15 Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1942. 
 16 Id. 
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I want humbly to suggest, however, that the proposals could be 
further improved by more extensive engagement with the theory 
behind the textualist outcomes we see from some courts.  For 
example, I do not think it is by any means clear that the JCT’s 
proposal, if enacted, would succeed in changing the result in a court 
with a voting majority of textualists.17  To make that prediction, we 
first have to understand what the textualists’ objections are and then 
consider carefully whether the JCT’s proposal really meets them.  I 
argue here that it probably does not. 
At the same time, Chirelstein and Zelenak may have decided that 
the elephant is bigger than it really is.  As I will attempt to show, it is 
possible for a well-designed statute to overcome textualist arguments 
against judicial invocation of broad policy tools such as the economic 
substance doctrine.  Indeed, such a statute could draw on many of the 
insights Chirelstein and Zelenak offer, while at the same time 
maintaining the flexibility to adapt to innovations in tax-sheltering 
that seems somewhat lacking (by design) in their current proposal. 
Finally, understanding the theory of textualism helps us to see 
that many of the arguments against regulating tax shelters more 
generally are fairly weak when confronted with a carefully drafted 
statute.  For example, critics of Professor Weisbach’s powerful 
challenge to tax planning raise what prove to be textualist-flavored 
objections to any potential judicial solution.18  Those objections, I 
show, can be met relatively easily once we understand the actual 
content of their claims. 
Thus, in this article I not only lay out and analyze the 
interpretative theory underlying textualist challenges to tax shelter 
regulation, but also suggest a possible new — or, really, hybrid — 
formulation of a codified economic substance doctrine.  Many of the 
particulars were crafted by others.  My main effort here is to show 
how the pieces can best be fit together to rebut textualist challenges. 
The article proceeds in five parts.  I begin the first part by 
reviewing briefly the economic substance doctrine (the doctrine) and 
its discontents.  The part quickly moves on to discuss several 
suggestions to codify the doctrine, each of them aimed at shoring up 
one or more weaknesses in its current, common law incarnation.  Part 
III.A explores the theoretical underpinnings of the textualist 
 17 Other commentators appear to have assumed that codification would oblige a 
court to adhere to the newly codified economic substance doctrine.  See infra note 63.  
As I discuss here, that is not necessarily an obvious conclusion. 
 18 See infra text accompanying notes 157–58. 
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challenge to judicial invocation of the economic substance doctrine.  
Part III.B explains how the Chirelstein and Zelenak proposal 
sidesteps those challenges, but then elaborates on why no sidestep 
should be needed. 
Part IV considers another textualist-inspired criticism of the 
doctrine.  Critics point out that purposivist efforts to identify shelters 
are often paralyzed by the difficulty that Congress clearly does intend 
to tax-favor some transactions.  Given that the plain text is often our 
best clue to congressional intent, it may be difficult to discern shelter 
from subsidy.  By obliging Congress to identify its intended tax-
favored transactions by a clear statement, we can remove any doubt 
that the remaining tax favors are accidents of drafting. 
Part V applies these lessons.  In particular, I argue that there 
remains no particularly convincing argument against Weisbach’s view 
that the law should discourage all tax planning.  Thus we might, for 
example, pursue a codified doctrine that would permit the Internal 
Revenue Service (Service) to disregard a taxpayer’s characterization 
of a transaction if one of several main purposes for engaging in any 
part of the transaction is to realize a tax benefit or if no reasonable 
businessperson would have carried out the transaction in that way, but 
for the resulting tax benefits.  Borrowing from Chirelstein and 
Zelenak, I suggest that Congress could also carve out specifically 
identified tax-favored transactions that would be exempt from re-
characterization even if engaged in unreasonably or for tax avoidance 
purposes.  Combining these two steps largely resolves the theoretical 
problems identified earlier. 
I then conclude. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The economic substance doctrine is a set of judicially-crafted rules 
of interpretation for tax statutes.19  In general, the doctrine operates to 
disallow a taxpayer’s characterization of a particular business 
transaction where, although the transaction in form meets the literal 
terms of the statute, in substance it “seeks to claim tax benefits, 
unintended by Congress.”20  In this context Congress is usually 
 19 Bankman, supra note 1, at 7–11; Alexandra M. Walsh, Note, Formally Legal, 
Probably Wrong: Corporate Tax Shelters, Practical Reason and the New Textualism, 
53 STAN. L. REV. 1541, 1544 (2001). 
 20 ACM P’ship v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2215 (1997), aff’d, 157 
F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).  In this article I do not make any effort to sort out the various 
strands of common law doctrine, some of them occasionally appearing under other 
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understood to intend to give tax-favorable treatment only to a 
transaction that has a meaningful effect on the taxpayer’s real 
economic situation or that was entered into with a real business 
purpose.21  Courts are divided on whether these standards must both 
be met in order for a transaction to pass muster,22 disagree about how 
to analyze the scope of a “transaction,”23 and differ on how much risk 
or possibility of profit must exist in order to qualify a transaction as 
having economic substance.24
While these variations can make for some complicated legal 
analysis, the greater concern among policy makers is that, 
increasingly, the economic substance doctrine is proving to have no 
substance at all.25  Since the mid-1980s, as “textualist” theories of 
statutory interpretation have become more prevalent, courts have 
grown increasingly skeptical of judge-made tax policy, especially 
where that policy has the effect of negating the clear lexical meaning 
of the text.26  It was only a matter of time before textualist courts 
began refusing to apply the economic substance doctrine at all.27
In response to both sets of problems, the JCT has proposed 
codifying the economic substance doctrine.28  The JCT’s proposal is, in 
some senses, fairly limited.  The proposal notes that it “only applies to 
cases in which a court determines that the economic substance 
doctrine is relevant” and expressly states that it is not intended to 
names, that have similar effects as the economic substance doctrine.  See Martin J. 
McMahon, Jr., Random Thoughts on Applying Judicial Doctrines to Interpret the 
Internal Revenue Code, 54 SMU L. REV. 195, 195 (2001) (describing differences 
among doctrines as “abstract” and “fairly gossamer”). 
 21 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 14–16. 
 22 Bankman, supra note 1, at 26. 
 23 See id. at 15; David P. Hariton, Kafka and the Tax Shelter, 57 TAX L. REV. 1, 
30 (2003). 
 24 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 14–16; Lee A. 
Sheppard, Drafting Economic Substance, Continued, 99 TAX NOTES 597, 598–99 (May 
5, 2003). 
 25 See Samuel C. Thompson Jr., Despite Widespread Opposition, Congress 
Should Codify the ESD, 110 TAX NOTES 781, 782 (Feb. 13, 2006). 
 26 See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778, 784 (5th 
Cir. 2001); IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 356 (8th Cir. 2001); ACM 
P’ship v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231, 265 (3d Cir. 1998) (McKee, J., dissenting); 
Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 740–41 (2004). 
 27 See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 4, 26. 
 28 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 18 (explaining 
“reasons for change”). 
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modify common law except as otherwise stated.29  What the proposal 
would do is resolve a pair of circuit splits, by instructing that a valid 
transaction must have both economic substance and business purpose 
and by defining economic substance to require a “meaningful change 
in the taxpayer’s economic position.”30  Even these provisions would 
apply only in the context of six “applicable transactions,” which the 
JCT finds to be most suspect, as well as in any others added by 
Treasury.31  Earlier, already enacted provisions provide for a forty 
percent penalty for undisclosed transactions failing the test, which 
drops to twenty percent if the transaction is disclosed.32
There are a variety of other proposals.  Some (especially tax 
practitioners) suggest adhering to the status quo, perhaps with some 
additional disclosure requirements.33  Others tinker at the margins of 
(or anticipate, with slight variation) the JCT plan, offering improved 
wording of some of its provisions, a different resolution of the circuit 
splits, and the like.34
More radically, Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak have 
suggested, in essence, giving up on efforts to write the economic 
substance doctrine into law.  They argue that efforts to elevate 
economic substance will simply lead to tax shelters in which shelter 
participants will insert just enough risk or chance for gain to meet the 
minimum threshold for tax compliance.35  They propose instead a 
bright-line regime, in which Congress would flatly disallow 
noneconomic losses, as well as noneconomic deferral of gain or 
acceleration of loss through the use of tax-indifferent parties.36  
However, they provide that Congress or Treasury may make 
exceptions for certain noneconomic losses intended by Congress.37  
Similarly, Professor Weisbach has noted that well-designed shelter 
 29 Id. at 18, 20. 
 30 Id. at 21–22. 
 31 Id. at 19–21, 28. 
 32 Id. at 17. 
 33 See, e.g., Hebert N. Beller, ABA Tax Section Offers Comments, Concerns 
Regarding CARE Act Provisions, 2003 TNT 81-74 (Apr. 24, 2003); Michael P. Boyle, 
TEI Opposes Revenue Raisers in Senate Tax Relief Bill, 2006 TNT 7-19 (Jan. 10, 
2006); Thomas J. Purcell, III, AICPA Expresses Concerns over Some Tax Relief Act 
Provisions, 2006 TNT 3-19 (Dec. 23, 2005); Bernard Wolfman, Letter to the Editor, 
Why Economic Substance Is Better Left Uncodified, 104 TAX NOTES 445, 445 (July 26, 
2004) (arguing that codification would result in too much doctrinal rigidity). 
 34 See, e.g., Hariton, supra note 23, at 30–31, 33; Sheppard, supra note 24, at 600. 
 35 Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1955, 1962. 
 36 Id. at 1952–53. 
 37 Id. at 1955–56. 
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legislation should “require Congress to specify all intentional 
subsidies and the manner in which they may be used.”38
A key aspect of the Chirelstein and Zelenak proposal is its 
deliberate rigidity.  Chirelstein and Zelenak, I suspect, would freely 
concede at least that they have chosen the less flexible approach to 
combating tax shelters; they are quite up front about their choice to 
use, in essence, a “rule” rather than a “standard.”39  That is, they 
deliberately prefer to set out detailed prescriptions for dealing with 
certain forms of transactions, with no apparatus in their scheme for 
adjusting to subsequent efforts by taxpayers to achieve similar tax-
avoiding results by other means.40  One express rationale they offer 
for their choice is that, in their view, it better provides for an effective 
deterrent to would-be shelterers.41  I am somewhat skeptical of that 
claim, for reasons I will explain in detail in Part V. 
Chirelstein and Zelenak also offer another rationale, although 
perhaps it is just slightly below the surface of their argument.  Their 
article, as well as Professor Zelenak’s earlier writings, suggest 
skepticism about whether judge-made tax doctrines can succeed in 
doing anything other than replicating each individual judge’s tax-
policy preferences.42  Thus, tax-shelter-friendly judges will remain 
friendly to shelters irrespective of codification of economic substance 
doctrines.43  I want to suggest, in Part IV, that this worry is 
fundamentally a textualist one and that Chirelstein and Zelenak’s 
terrific solution in fact can resolve it equally well in a less-rigid scheme 
than the one they offer.  First, though, I want to consider another 
possible strength of their proposal. 
 38 David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 225 
n.22 (2002). 
 39 For a discussion of the basic concept of the rule/standard tradeoff, see Duncan 
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 
1687–88 (1976), and in tax law particularly, see Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the 
Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management of Tax Detail, 34 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 699–702 (1969). 
Professor Zelenak had already put his cards on the table about his distrust of 
standards, and his search for a “silver-bullet” rule, four years earlier.  Lawrence 
Zelenak, Codifying Anti-Avoidance Doctrines and Controlling Corporate Tax 
Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 177, 185–86, 191–93 (2001). 
 40 Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1951.  The duo argue, though, that 
their proposal is broad enough to prevent new shelters, id., which seems fairly 
optimistic given the money at stake and talent available. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See id. at 1948, 1953. 
 43 See id. at 1949; Zelenak, supra note 39, at 186–87. 
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III. DOES TEXTUALISM DOOM ANY EFFORT TO CODIFY ECONOMIC 
SUBSTANCE? 
As I have mentioned, for many tax shelter commentators, the 
most significant challenge posed by the rise of modern textualism is 
not necessarily the force of its critique so much as the likelihood that 
the textualist judge will reject existing efforts to regulate shelters.  As 
we will see in a moment, the textualist judge is likely to reject judge-
made rules that supplement the actual words of a technical tax statute.  
In other words, the textualist would not apply the economic substance 
doctrine.  Quite possibly, the textualist would hesitate to employ 
common law methods, such as economic substance analysis, even if 
strongly encouraged to do so by Congress.  That would leave us, still, 
with the possibility that shelter participants could continue to play the 
“textualist lottery.” 
It might be said in favor of Chirelstein and Zelenak that their 
proposal shortcuts this problem entirely.  By substituting bright-line 
rules for any judicial conclusions about whether a transaction has 
economic substance, they sidestep the need to convince the textualist 
judge.  While it is unclear whether that was one of their goals, it is 
undeniably a significant potential advantage of their approach.44
As a result, in order to appraise our options, we first have to 
understand the nature of the problem to be solved.  Is there a serious 
likelihood that textualists would resist even a codified economic 
substance doctrine?  If so, Chirelstein and Zelenak’s offering looks 
much more appealing.  To be sure one way or the other, we would 
have to understand better the reasons for the textualist’s reluctance to 
dabble in common law methods.  Is the problem a lack of 
congressional authorization or is it something else, such as a general 
doubt about, or constitutional constraint on, judicial power?  
Surprisingly, there is no sustained consideration of that question, even 
in the interpretative theory literature.  In this part, I argue that it is 
highly unlikely that textualists would in principle be able to refuse to 
implement a codified economic substance doctrine, leaving us free to 
look to other strengths and weaknesses of the competing codification 
proposals. 
 44 There are some indications, though, that Chirelstein and Zelenak are 
concerned about the appeal to courts of the argument that “rules are rules” 
irrespective of economic substance.  Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1940, 
1946–47. 
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A.  The Textualist Challenge to Economic Substance 
First, it is worth a paragraph or two to clarify what I mean by 
“textualist.”  It is possible to describe a textualist broadly as any 
interpreter who claims that the primary authoritative source of 
meaning in a statute is its words.45  But, in a modern era in which most 
interpreters place a very high degree of importance on the words of a 
statute,46 this definition is not very helpful to us in pinpointing just 
those interpreters who tend to resist the economic substance doctrine.  
For instance, some writers who might fall within this very broad 
textualist umbrella claim that the import of words must be divined by 
the meaning those words would have held at the time of the statute’s 
enactment,47 with some further disagreement about whether that 
entails their public meaning,48 the meaning actually understood by the 
statute’s enactors,49 or the meaning that should reasonably be imputed 
 45 At first glance this definition might seem to include anyone who interprets 
statutes.  However, there are significant differences in how various schools of 
interpretative thought believe the words of a statute relate to judicial applications of 
the statute.  John Manning, for example, distinguishes textualists from those who 
would use legislative history as a way of authoritatively construing a statute’s 
meaning.  John F. Manning, Putting Legislative History to a Vote: A Response to 
Professor Siegel, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1529 n.2 (2000) [hereinafter Manning, 
Response to Siegel].  For Manning a key difference between authoritative meaning and 
other meanings is that authoritative meaning compels a court’s reading, while other 
sources of information about how to read a statute might merely be guides or hints.  
See id.  As I will explain shortly, this distinction is largely what divides those I 
describe as textualists from those I label purposivists.  Purposivists, in my taxonomy, 
treat the words of the statute mostly as evidence about legislative purpose, rather 
than as authoritative boundaries on a court’s authority.  Obviously, these are zones on 
a continuum rather than bright lines.  As the degree of deference one gives to a 
source of evidence increases, it comes to look more and more like an authoritative 
source.  And, as the occasions for straying from authority’s dictates grow in number, 
the authority begins to seem more like mere evidence.  Cf. John Manning, What 
Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 75–76 (2006) 
[hereinafter Manning, What Divides] (noting that so-called textualists and 
purposivists both consider goals of legislation and context of statutes’ words in 
reaching a conclusion and that what divides them is what they “emphasize”). 
 46 See Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 348 (2005) 
(stating that “no critic of textualism believes that statutory text is unimportant”).
 47 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 61 (1988). 
 48 See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1132–33 (2003). 
 49 Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the 
Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 
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to the enactors.50  Yet others we might call textualists assert that the 
meaning of words in a statute is dynamic and should depend on the 
understanding of the present-day audience or the judge who is 
interpreting them.51  In practice, some of these species — especially 
the dynamic interpreters — refuse to describe themselves as 
textualists, even while they ostensibly acknowledge the supremacy of 
the text.52  Not much is at stake for us in these terminological disputes. 
With apologies, then, for overlooking what may be some 
important but fine-grained distinctions, I will generally lump judges 
into two categories: textualists and purposivists.  Many of those whom 
I call purposivists meet the very broad “textualist” standard of 
assigning interpretive primacy to the text of a statute.  But what I 
mean here by purposivists are those who would utilize the words of 
the text (and, conceivably, other sources, such as legislative history or 
their own view of what is “reasonable”) to construct a standard, rather 
than a rule.53  They look at the words, ask “what is this statute 
intended to accomplish?” and construe the terms in light of that 
purpose.54  At times they will place this purpose above the literal 
words of a particular provision.  Against this I set “textualists.”  In my 
usage, a textualist is an interpreter who assigns the highest 
TUL. L. REV. 803, 808–10 (1994). 
 50 See Caleb Nelson, A Response to Professor Manning, 91 VA. L. REV. 451, 464–
66 (2005) (discussing role of canons as imputed meaning); Richard A. Posner, Legal 
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 189–91 (1986); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation 
— In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 810, 817 (1983).  
But note that Posner describes himself in these pieces as quite receptive to nontextual 
sources of evidence of the words’ meaning, which would put his classification as a 
textualist somewhat in doubt; in my simple schema he is mostly a purposivist.  See 
infra note 51.
 51 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 20, 23 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1479, 1497 (1987); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: 
Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 56–71 (1994); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory 
Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 309 (1989).
 52 See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 3, 29–35 (2006). 
 53 See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court 1997 Term — Foreword: The Limits 
of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 19–20 n.74 (1998). 
 54 For a classic example, see HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE 
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).  For a leading tax scholar’s 
similar views, see Joseph Bankman, Stanford Professor Rebuts Criticisms of 
Partnership Antiabuse Reg., 94 TNT 140-33 (July 20, 1994). 
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interpretive priority to the words of the statute, in their context.55  The 
textualist will resort to “purpose” inquiries only rarely, and even then, 
usually only at a fairly low level of generality.56
Textualists, as I have described them, are likely to be hostile to 
the economic substance doctrine.57  The doctrine rejects literal 
taxpayer interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code’s (Code) rules 
that run counter to a broad standard disfavoring tax planning for its 
own sake.58  The textualist is unwilling to replace clear textual rules 
with standards supposedly implicit in the statute.  Unsurprisingly, 
then, as textualism has become more prevalent over the past two 
decades, the doctrine has been subjected to ever-increasing skepticism 
from textualist-minded courts.  The Federal Court of Claims’ opinion 
in Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States59 is typical.  There, the trial 
court found that the taxpayer satisfied the literal terms of the statute 
and it rejected the Government’s economic substance argument, 
noting that “under constitutional separation of powers, judges should 
determine congressional intent by the language of the Code, rather 
than deciding what tax policy should be.”60  For good measure, the 
court added a brief disquisition on the evils of judicial lawmaking, 
emphasizing its effects on private planning — in effect, arguing that 
 55 E.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 87–92, 99 (1991) (Scalia, 
J.); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 424 
(2005); Nelson, supra note 50, at 467–68.  Textualists may disagree on how broadly 
they ought to look in locating the context of a phrase’s meaning, with very broad 
context perhaps tending towards purposivism.  See George H. Taylor, Structural 
Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 347, 350 (1995); Adrian Vermeule, Three Strategies 
of Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 607, 618–22 (2005). 
 56 In other words, the textualist looks at “purpose” primarily in order to 
understand the meaning of particular words used in the statute — for example, 
whether the word “rule” means “exert dominion over” or “demarcate with evenly 
spaced lines.”  See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 546 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting); Manning, What Divides, supra note 45, at 91–96 
(explaining that textualists prioritize “semantic” context while purposivists put more 
weight on “policy” context); Nelson, supra note 50, at 463.  The purposivist, in 
contrast, may look to the more general intentions of Congress regarding how to apply 
the statute in various contexts.  For more thorough discussions, see, e.g., William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., The Circumstances of Politics and the Application of Statutes, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 558, 572–74 (2000); Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean 
Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 625–26 (1949). 
 57 See Walsh, supra note 19, at 1545. 
 58 Bankman, supra note 1, at 7–11. 
 59 62 Fed. Cl. 716 (2004). 
 60 Id. at 753 (citing, inter alia, Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 544–45 (Scalia, J., 
concurring and dissenting)). 
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statutes should be treated as embodying rules, not standards.61
Interestingly, one other point the Coltec court mentions, without 
real explanation, is that Congress has repeatedly considered but not 
enacted a codification of the economic substance doctrine.62  
Evidently the court’s implication is that Congress has affirmatively 
chosen rules over standards.  But that only begs a larger question: 
supposing Congress were to codify the doctrine, would the Coltec 
court, or any other textualist, give it any more heed? 
This is a crucial question for would-be codifiers.  Other 
commentators largely agree that, even if codification does little to 
improve the content of the doctrine, at a minimum it is worthwhile to 
the extent that it can force courts like the Coltec court to apply the 
doctrine at all.  These writers, too, seemingly overlook the point that 
the rationale that drives courts to resist an uncodified doctrine might 
apply fully to the doctrine codified.63  If so, we have to find a way to 
design a “fix” to the problem of unwanted tax planning that avoids 
that rationale. 
B.  The Chirelstein and Zelenak Solution and Why It May Be 
Unnecessary 
This, then, is another potential appeal of the Chirelstein and 
Zelenak proposal.  Again, rather than mandating that courts apply the 
economic substance doctrine, they have for the most part simply 
 61 Id. at 753–56.  The Federal Circuit later reversed the Court of Claims, 
explaining that both its own precedent and Supreme Court precedent included cases 
applying the economic substance doctrine.  Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 
F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  It is unclear how persuasive this second Coltec opinion 
will prove to textualist-minded courts elsewhere.  For one thing, the Federal Circuit 
omits from its list of Supreme Court precedents one of the Court’s most recent shelter 
cases, a Justice Thomas-authored opinion in which the Court applied a very literal 
reading of the statute and refused to consider purposive arguments arguably contrary 
to its reading of the putatively “plain” language of the applicable statute.  Gitlitz v. 
Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206, 212–20 (2001).  Second, the Supreme Court authority on 
which the Federal Circuit relies for the proposition that textualism is not required by 
the separation of powers in fact probably does not stand for that proposition.  See 
infra note 77. 
 62 Coltec, 62 Fed. Cl. at 756. 
 63 See, e.g., Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 6 (claiming that there is 
“little doubt” Congress has the power to require that courts apply substance-over-
form rules); Zachary Nahass, Comment, Codifying the Economic Substance Doctrine: 
A Proposal on the Doorstep of Usefulness, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 247, 264 (2006); 
Weisbach, supra note 38, at 218–19 (“[S]tatutes and regulations can be changed in any 
imaginable manner.”). 
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identified the most problematic transactions and set them off limits.  
To the extent that we think that judicial resistance to the economic 
substance doctrine, in any form, is a substantial obstacle, their 
approach leapfrogs the obstacle nicely.  The catch here is that, in fact, 
there is no principled basis for extending the textualist opposition to 
the (putatively) uncodified economic substance doctrine to an 
encoded version.  Whatever more pragmatic hesitation some courts 
may have will, I hope, be undermined by a careful demonstration that 
such hesitation cannot stand on principle.  Thus, in this subsection I 
ask whether the principles underlying textualism would require the 
textualist to resist any legislative efforts to impose purposivist 
methodology, as the codification of the economic substance doctrine 
would do for all tax statutes. 
Would Judge McKee or the Coltec trial court be obliged to apply 
a codified doctrine?  It seems plain enough, on a policy level, why 
textualists would resist allowing textualist methods easily to be 
defeasible by Congress.64  Some textualists have argued, frankly, that 
their goal is to limit the reach of government.65  Textualism greatly 
reduces Congress’ power, not only by reducing the sweep of individual 
statutes to their terms, but also by requiring frequent legislative 
reconsideration of old enactments, inducing more careful deliberation 
by Congress in anticipating how each enactment will be applied, and 
raising the stakes for parties to any compromise.66  Bargaining 
becomes more extended and more intense because the outcome of the 
negotiation will be more difficult to modify later.  The result is that 
more “space” is left for private ordering and market solutions.67  
Other textualists argue, relatedly, that textualism is more 
“majoritarian,” in the sense that rules made by courts can be effected 
by a single litigant, while rules crafted by Congress, obviously, must 
command widespread political support.68  Because of the difficulty of 
 64 See Walsh, supra note 19, at 1566–67. 
 65 E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 63 (1994). 
 66 Manning, Response to Siegel, supra note 45, at 1529, 1540 n.47; Muriel 
Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 
585, 593–615 (1994).  At the same time, textualism may arguably increase the 
importance of Congress relative to courts.  But the point here is simply that both 
courts and Congress generally can accomplish less under a textualist regime. 
 67 Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 549–50 
(1983).  But see Einer R.  Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive 
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 94–100 (1991) (arguing that background rules left 
in place by textualism are themselves legal rules, not market ordering). 
 68 See Easterbrook, supra note 67, at 536; Easterbrook, supra note 47, at 61–62.
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obtaining such broad agreement, many possible efforts at rulemaking 
will fail, so that majoritarianism overlaps somewhat with the first, 
libertarian purpose.  But, in fairness, majoritarianism might have 
other virtues.  Many commentators believe that courts, in forcing 
Congress to speak clearly to give effect to its dictates, also force 
Congress to be more “republican” — that is, to debate among many 
viewpoints, hopefully in a principled way — and to be more 
“transparent” — that is, to make more evident to its constituents the 
rules Congress has chosen for them.69
Yet some of these same principles suggest that the textualist 
would have to accept the “anti-textualist” statute, or on a smaller 
scale, a codification of economic substance.  If a goal of textualism is 
to elevate the policy choices reached after a deliberative and 
transparent process over those made by a small body of experts in an 
obscure courthouse, then the textualist has little ground to assert that 
her preference for textualism must prevail over the considered view of 
the legislature.70  In a sense, the codified economic substance doctrine 
is nothing more than a sort of “dictionary act” for the Code.  The 
doctrine defines — unobjectionably, one would think — what sorts of 
transactions are truly those Congress wants to provide with favorable 
tax treatment.71  The textualist should have to respect statutory text 
that tells her how to read the rest of the statute. 
On the other hand, there are some forms of decisions that we 
generally think courts ought to make for themselves, even if contrary 
to Congress’ direction or definition.  In other words, the textualist 
might say that the “dictionary” part of the statute she is reading is 
unconstitutional.  While constitutional rights come quickly to mind, in 
practice the Court often defers matters of constitutional dimension to 
legislative determination — as, for example, with the scope of the 
“necessary and proper” clause.72  Therefore the textualist still would 
 69 See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE 
L.J. 65, 73 (1983).  On the transparency argument, see Finley v. United States, 490 
U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (Scalia, J.); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the 
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 416 (1989) (describing this view).
 70 See Walsh, supra note 19, at 1567 (arguing that even Justice Scalia should have 
to accept that Congress can impose standards instead of rules). 
 71 Cf. Brian J. Arnold, The Long, Slow, Steady Demise of the General Anti-
Avoidance Rule, 52 CAN. TAX. J. 488, 499 (2004) (making similar point with respect to 
Canadian efforts to codify an anti-abuse rule for tax statutes); Nicholas Quinn 
Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2103–
09 (2002) (arguing that general interpretive rules supplied in statutes are theoretically 
unobjectionable because no different than dictionary definitions). 
 72 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
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have two theoretical challenges in resisting codification of the doctrine 
— first, to locate some source of constitutional authority for her 
textualist resistance to the “dictionary” text, and second, some 
additional ground for enforcing the Constitution — for elevating her 
choice of interpretive method above the legislature’s. 
Professor Rosenkranz has suggested a similar analysis.  He claims 
that, for any individual statute, there would be little argument that 
Congress cannot instruct a court how to read the terms of the statute.73  
He acknowledges that the Constitution will often suggest a 
background rule that will prevail in the absence of legislation, but for 
the most part he argues that Congress can displace these 
presumptions by statute in the same way it can displace any other 
common law.74  However, he also notes that the Supreme Court’s 
cases seem to imply the existence of another category, which he terms 
“constitutional default rules,” in which the underlying constitutional 
norm can be displaced only one statute at a time.75  He cites as an 
example the Court’s presumption that states cannot be sued in federal 
court, a presumption that could not be displaced by a generic 
definitional statute including “states” as “persons” for purposes of the 
entire Code.76  Rather, Congress can only subject states to suit under a 
federal provision by expressly displacing state liability as to that 
individual provision.  Thus, we really have two sets of questions about 
the constitutionality of any codification effort.  First, whether it is 
constitutional even if applied only to a single statute.  And, second, 
whether there is any sort of “constitutional default rule,” like the 
sovereign immunity clear statement rule, that would make it difficult 
to codify economic substance across the whole of the Code at a single 
stroke. 
Turning first to whether codification could be permissible even in 
a single statute, one common constitutional argument for textualism is 
apparently that it is a necessary incident of the separation of powers.  
Congress, it is claimed, makes laws, while courts should only interpret 
them.77  Put in a more sophisticated frame, the claim is that the text of 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1217 (1978). 
 73 Rosenkranz, supra note 71, at 2103–09. 
 74 Id. at 2095–96. 
 75 Id. at 2097. 
 76 Id. at 2122–23. 
 77 See Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 753–56 (2004); 
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 9–13, 34–35 (Amy Gutmann 
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a statute is the output of a negotiated legislative process and only by 
applying that text fairly formally, can courts remain faithful to the 
agreement embodied in the deal.78  A group of negotiators, who may 
arrive at consensus for many different reasons, has no “intention” to 
which a court can be faithful, and so replacing the text with a meaning 
derived from an imputed “intention,” undermines legislative power.79
It is not immediately apparent how this theory would rule out 
codification.  As many critics have pointed out, legislative bodies can 
reach (or agree not to reach) consensus on many different levels of 
generality, so that the “deal” that is put into place can, in fact, be a 
deal to defer rule-making authority to courts (as in, for example, the 
Sherman Act).80  A codified economic substance doctrine could be a 
similar type of high-level agreement.  Moreover, all interpretation 
ed., 1997); see also The Queen v. Canada Trustco Mortgage Co., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, 
at para. 41 (Can.); Arnold, supra note 71, at 499 (noting same arguments offered by 
Canadian courts). 
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument in the Coltec appeal, citing to a 
Supreme Court opinion in which it claimed the Court had rejected a separation of 
powers challenge to a purposive reading of a statute.  Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United 
States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982)).  I think the Federal Circuit probably 
somewhat misread the continuing significance of Merrill Lynch.  That was a case in 
which the Court permitted suit under a so-called “implied” right of action — an 
authorization for suit that was not expressed in the clear words of the federal statute 
the plaintiffs were attempting to enforce.  456 U.S. at 375, 381.  The modern rule for 
private suits in federal court, however, is that in fact a claim exists only where there is 
a clear statement authorizing a private suit.  Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 
286–87 (2001).  The Court has explained Merrill Lynch as simply embodying the 
principle that, where Congress reenacts statutory language after a court (in retrospect, 
erroneously) has implied a right of action under that language, Congress in effect has 
expressly authorized suit.  Id. at 288.  The Court added that, when it comes to finding 
private rights of action, “[w]e have never accorded dispositive weight to context shorn 
of text” and that “legal context matters only to the extent it clarifies text.”  Id.  While 
perhaps this view of Merrill Lynch is a revisionist one, it is, obviously, authoritative.  
Indeed, the private right of action caselaw may have been a uniquely bad example for 
the Coltec court to have drawn on, since that area seems to reflect a strong textualist 
influence.  See Brian D. Galle, Can Federal Agencies Authorize Private Suits under 
Section 1983?  A Theoretical Approach, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 163, 185 (2003). 
 78 See Easterbrook, supra note 65, at 68; Nelson, supra note 50, at 460–63; 
Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 129–39 (2000). 
 79 See Molot, supra note 52, at 28. 
 80 See Eskridge, supra note 56, at 572–74; Galle, supra note 77, at 183–86; 
Rosenkranz, supra note 71, at 2115–20.  I am omitting here the possibility that there 
may be other limits on Congress’ authority to delegate decision making power to 
other actors, none of which seem to have much traction when it comes to delegations 
to courts.  See Rosenkranz, supra note 71, at 2126–39. 
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includes some baseline assumptions about how text is to be 
interpreted, such as the rules of grammar.  As we saw, textualists 
accept purposivism at this level — where it includes lexical context, if 
not policy context.81  Similarly, at least some textualists accept the 
“absurd results” doctrine, which holds that a court can ignore even the 
plain words of a text when the result is obviously not “right.”82  That 
necessarily includes a recognition that statutes have purposes from 
which the text can deviate.  Once Congress has itself instructed a court 
to engage in purposive analysis, and we have acknowledged (as in the 
absurd results doctrine) that at least some contextual analysis is 
permissible, it is hard to see how legislative supremacy or faithfulness 
to the terms of a statutory “deal” can justify drawing a bright line on 
the continuum of context beyond which courts cannot cross.  Thus, the 
separation of powers argument offered by the Coltec court does not 
appear to rule out congressional efforts to require purposive 
interpretation. 
There may, though, be other constitutional bases on which the 
Coltec court could have drawn.  Surprisingly, although much has been 
written about the constitutional provenance of textualism, there is 
almost no scholarly examination of whether textualism as a method 
can be displaced by Congress.  The most extensive effort is a short 
reply article by John Manning.83  Professor Manning argues that 
Congress could not enact a statute declaring that, for all future 
statutes, courts must consider legislative history to have been 
incorporated into the text of the statute.84  His claim seems to be that 
this arrangement violates separation of powers just as much as the use 
of legislative history absent congressional authorization.  In both 
situations, he maintains, Congress improperly delegates law-making 
power to a subsidiary within the legislative branch.85  That argument 
seems a bit circular, but we do not need to probe it closely here.  
Manning states expressly that congressional delegations to other 
branches, because they necessarily invite checks on legislative will by 
the other governmental actors, are not constitutionally suspect in the 
 81 See supra note 56. 
 82 See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527–28 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); John Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2391–
92, 2419–20 (2003) (“[E]ven the staunchest modern textualists still embrace and 
apply, even if rarely, at least some version of the absurdity doctrine.”).  But see 
Manning, supra, at 2391–92, 2419–20 (arguing that these other textualists are wrong). 
 83 Manning, Response to Siegel, supra note 45. 
 84 Id. at 1530–31. 
 85 Id. at 1533–35. 
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way he condemns for legislative history.86  That is the situation with 
codification of the economic substance doctrine: it is not self-
delegation, but rather power-sharing between Congress and courts. 
We can imagine, however, two more applicable approaches.  
Consider the claim that “the judicial power” granted by Article III 
itself does not include the authority to interpret federal statutes 
except with regard to meaning clearly implicit on the face of the 
statute.87  If we thought that Article III was limited in this way, then 
codification could perhaps be unconstitutional.88  John Manning has 
argued that the original meaning of Article III curtails courts’ 
interpretive power, preventing them from relying much on legislative 
history.89  But Manning acknowledges that his originalist analysis does 
not do much else to confine courts.  In his exchange with Professor 
Eskridge, he admits that his reading would largely permit the 
purposivist approach advocated by Eskridge, allowing judges to 
consider the objects of legislation in interpreting its literal language.90
Another possible Article III argument might draw on the 
literature of “clear statement rules.”  Scholars, in particular Larry 
Sager, have argued that a number of constitutional terms are not 
enforced directly by the courts, often out of deference to the superior 
 86 That is, Manning argues that by giving authoritative force to legislative 
history, Congress would be, in effect, making law without bicameralism and 
presentment.  Id. at 1538–40.  This, he says, would be unconstitutional in much the 
same way that the single-house veto of administrative actions was unconstitutional in 
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  Manning, Response to Siegel, supra note 45, at 
1535–37. 
 87 See Molot, supra note 52, at 7–9 (describing this argument). 
 88 That is, we might conclude that courts cannot accept a delegation to them of 
authority to fill in gaps in the meaning or application of statutes.  The Sherman Act, 
therefore, would be unconstitutional under this view.  I say “perhaps” with respect to 
codification of economic substance because it is possible that our historical reading of 
Article III might be inconclusive with respect to dictionary-type definitions.  Where 
the line demarcating acceptably “clear” statutory language from overly vague 
definitions resides would be a thorny problem, as I discuss in the text a few 
paragraphs from now. 
 89 John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 8–9 (2001). 
 90 John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the 
Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1663 (2001); see William N. Eskridge, Jr., No 
Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2051 (2006) (reviewing ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION (2006)); Molot, supra note 52, at 42, 45 (arguing that, other than 
differing views on the use of legislative history, there is not much ground between 
originalist constitutional claims by Manning and Eskridge). 
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political accountability and practical policy-making skills of the other 
branches.91  Instead, the courts demand that legislation that trenches 
somewhat on the edges of the under-enforced value must be stated 
“clearly” before it will be understood in fact to displace the 
constitutional norm.  The goal, as with textualism more generally, is to 
make legislation more onerous to enact, but more deliberative and 
transparent when enacted.92  Moreover, the end result is a set of rights 
that is crafted not exclusively by courts, but by courts in cooperation 
with the political branches, so that the courts’ burden of rights-
elaboration is lightened by the contribution of political and practical 
insight from the other branches.93  For example, the Supreme Court 
has determined that for the most part it will not strike down federal 
legislation on the ground that it unduly expands federal power at the 
expense of state autonomy — largely, again, because the Court defers 
to the outcomes of the political process.94  But the Court does demand 
that legislation affecting so-called “core” state functions must do so 
clearly.95  And so, in theory, when legislation displaces core state 
functions, it does so after more elaborate consideration from both the 
courts and Congress.96
One could make a similar case for textualism more generally, or 
at least, for textualism in the special context of tax legislation.  
Scholars such as Randy Barnett have argued for a libertarian 
originalist reading of the Constitution, in which the main goal of that 
document is to preserve individual liberty from outsized government.97  
Yet as Barnett’s critics point out, we have already walked that road in 
the Lochner era, with the result that courts often made haphazard, 
uninformed, and anti-democratic decisions that undermined, nearly 
fatally, their public support.98  If we agree with Barnett (and this 
 91 See, e.g., Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power 
to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 104–05 (1986); Sager, supra note 72, 
at 1217. 
 92 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 631 (1992); 
William D. Popkin, Law-Making Responsibility and Statutory Interpretation, 68 IND. 
L.J. 865, 881 (1993). 
 93 Popkin, supra note 92, at 881. 
 94 E.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547–48 (1985). 
 95 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457–61 (1991). 
 96 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 92, at 624. 
 97 RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004). 
 98 E.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Lamenting Lochner’s Loss: Randy Barnett’s Case 
for a Libertarian Constitution, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 839 (2005) (reviewing BARNETT, 
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author does not) about his claims as a matter of constitutional 
interpretation, then his libertarian principle would seem to be a strong 
candidate for the sort of “under-enforced” legal norm that Sager 
discusses.99  In this view, the libertarian principle would seem right as 
a matter of first-order constitutional interpretation, but unworkable in 
practice.  And that, in turn, could lead us to textualism.  By raising the 
cost of legislation, we could protect somewhat libertarian values 
without outright prohibiting government regulation to the degree of 
the Lochner Court.  Alternatively, if this seems to paint with too 
broad a brush, we might agree with Learned Hand that there is a sort 
of tax exceptionalism100 — that there is some basic right to tax 
planning, to preserve private assets against state claims, and therefore, 
that efforts to restrain tax planning should have to overcome the 
“clear statement” speedbump. 
But even these theories, as radical as they may seem, would not of 
themselves bar codification of the economic substance doctrine.  
Codification, after all, is in a sense exactly the response that the 
theory of the clear statement rule hopes to produce.  After courts 
have resisted implementing implicit legislative goals that seemed to 
approach a protected area, Congress responds by affirming more 
clearly that it intends to press on. 
At most, then, these approaches might justify describing 
textualism as one of Professor Rosenkranz’s constitutional 
presumptions or default rules.  Of course, whether textualism should 
be properly considered a presumption or a default rule is highly 
significant to our present debate.  If textualism, or tax planning 
freedom, is only a presumption, then codification of the economic 
substance doctrine clearly satisfies its requirements.101  On the other 
supra note 97). 
 99 See Sager, supra note 72. 
 100 Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).  The court stated: 
We agree with the Board and the taxpayer that a transaction, otherwise 
within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity, because it is 
actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to evade, taxation.  Any one 
may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not 
bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not 
even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes. 
Id. at 810.  Of course, the Second Circuit went on to conclude that, irrespective of any 
such right, Congress’ purpose in enacting a tax statute must prevail over its literal 
terms.  Id. at 810–11. 
 101 See Rosenkranz, supra note 71, at 2096–98 (explaining that Congress may 
freely change a presumption or “constitutional starting point”). 
GALLE.FORMATTED.6.DOC 3/17/2007  2:28 PM 
2006] Interpretative Theory 379 
 
hand, if it is a “default rule” which therefore can be displaced by 
Congress only on a statute-by-statute basis, we then have a very 
difficult determination.  The codified doctrine, of course, applies not 
simply to one statute, but it is also not quite so broad as the entire 
Code.  Just how narrowly or broadly can a default-displacing 
provision sweep at a single stroke? 
Rosenkranz’s article, as thoughtful as it is, leaves these kinds of 
questions largely unanswered.  He does not offer any normative 
theory of how to distinguish presumptions from defaults, instead only 
observing that the Supreme Court seems to have treated state liability 
to private suit as the latter.  This is hardly a fault of Rosenkranz.  
What he is talking about, really, is the theory of under-enforced 
constitutional rights and the corresponding statutory rules of 
constitutional avoidance that go with them.  But the Court itself has 
never developed any coherent theory addressing the extent of 
Congress’ power to deprive courts of the avoidance power.  I have 
noted similar uncertainties about avoidance before.  For example, no 
one knows whether state legislatures could order state courts not to 
employ avoidance when interpreting either state or federal law.102  
And, on the question of how broad a default-displacing statute may 
be, I have described the Supreme Court’s own confusion over that 
question in the context of clear statement rules that protect state 
sovereign prerogatives.103
These doctrinal uncertainties may well be deliberate.  Fuzzy 
borders around our rules may keep potential trespassers — here, 
Congress — far from their edges.104  And the very premise of the 
notion of avoidance is that it minimizes the Court’s need to confront 
Congress and strike down the enactments of the more politically 
responsive branch.105  A very brightly demarcated definition of what 
Congress is permitted to do might oblige the Court to challenge 
Congress head-on much more often,106 diminishing the Court’s own 
store of political capital and good will.  And it removes some of the 
Court’s doctrinal flexibility.  Right now, the Court can require more 
 102 Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with 
Clear Thinking About Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 
210 (2004). 
 103 Id. at 162–66. 
 104 See Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: 
New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 137. 
 105 Galle, supra note 102, at 204–05. 
 106 See Molot, supra note 52, at 54–55 (arguing that consistent application of 
strong textualist methods tends to greatly expand judicial power). 
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or less narrow default-removing legislation, depending on its own 
sense of how important the underlying right is, how likely Congress is 
to respect the right, the Court’s own present capacity for resisting 
encroachments, and other similar factors.107  A hard and fast rule 
would likely make those adjustments either very difficult or, at least, 
much closer to the surface of the Court’s opinions than it seems 
presently to want to make them.108  So the space between default and 
presumption may well never be clearly set out — by design. 
For our present purposes, then, the certainty of uncertainty may 
be all we need.  It may be enough to say simply that it would take a 
dramatic new advance in the law of clear statement rules to invalidate 
codification of the economic substance doctrine and no such dramatic 
advance is likely to be forthcoming.  It therefore seems, at most, a 
very small advantage in favor of Chirelstein and Zelenak that their 
proposal would avoid this possible problem.  Further, even if there 
were a rule that very broad anti-clear-statement-rule statutes are 
impermissible, it is unclear where the line would fall dividing those 
that would be permissible and those that would not be.  The economic 
substance doctrine is fairly broad, but corporate tax planning is a 
small piece of the legislative world as a whole.  So, in short, there 
appears to be very little reason to fear that textualists would have any 
constitutional hook for resisting codification. 
IV. TEXTUALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF INTENDED TAX SUBSIDIES 
I do not say any of this in order to criticize Chirelstein and 
Zelenak.  Indeed, as I mentioned, my argument here relies on their 
powerful insight: that an express listing of approved or disapproved 
transactions has the potential to solve one of the largest conceptual 
challenges for the economic substance doctrine.109  In particular, a 
 107 Cf. Popkin, supra note 92, at 882–84 (pointing out that constitutionally-
inspired clear-statement rules leave to judges additional decisions about how broadly 
to apply underlying constitutional principle). 
 108 In addition, for reasons that are too complex to be worth getting into here, the 
Court likely has strong institutional reasons for wanting, rhetorically, to describe its 
interpretation of statutes, even under the aegis of a constitutional “default rule,” as 
something other than constitutional deliberations.  See Brian Galle, The Justice of 
Administration: Judicial Responses to Executive Claims of Independent Authority to 
Interpret the Constitution, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 157, 194–208 (2005).  But describing 
its work as constitutional interpretation is precisely what the Court would likely have 
to do in order to enunciate any clear theory of constitutional default rules.  Thus, I 
think we are unlikely to ever see such a theory, at least from the Court. 
 109 Cf. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1955–56. 
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major flaw in the doctrine is and has been that some tax benefits in 
fact are intended by Congress.  Leaving to courts the task of sorting 
tax shelter from tax subsidy exposes the whole enterprise to precisely 
the most trenchant criticisms of textualism.  In this part, I explain 
those criticisms and discuss how (I hope) incorporating this piece of 
the Chirelstein and Zelenak proposal into any codification effort 
blunts them.  At the same time, we see that, if an unfettered judiciary 
is our largest concern, this opt-in or opt-out scheme is enough on its 
own to solve the problem without resorting to outright abandonment 
of economic substance. 
A.  A Clear Statement Rule for Tax Benefits or Detriments 
Despite the possible downsides of tax planning, it is obvious that 
Congress sometimes intends to encourage it.110  Tax subsidies may 
correct a defective market, as where individual actors fail to 
internalize fully the benefits of a societal good.111  Or the tax system 
may simply provide an easily administered delivery vehicle for 
redistributive spending of various forms (not all of them laudable).112  
Yet Congress does not have infinite time and energy to write every 
tax statute in a way that perfectly exemplifies the policy tradeoffs 
Congress wants to achieve.113  And, of course, Congress cannot always 
foresee what effect a statutory text will have when mixed with real-
world financial transactions, some unimagined at the time of 
drafting.114  Ideally, then, Congress would like a shortcut, a way to 
enable courts readily to identify what portions of their statutes are 
designed to create subsidies and what portions are not.115
 110 See Bankman, supra note 1, at 13; Beller, supra note 33, at 5–6; see also The 
Queen v. Canada Trustco Mortgage Co., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, at paras. 16, 32 (Can.) 
(making same arguments with respect to Canadian Parliament). 
 111 See Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 
VA. L. REV. 1393, 1398 (1988). 
 112 PHILIP D. OLIVER, TAX POLICY: READINGS AND MATERIALS 569–84 (2d ed. 
2004). 
 113 See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 55–56; David A. Weisbach, 
Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 861–62 (1999). 
 114 See James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old “Brine” in New 
Bottles, 55 TAX L. REV. 135, 141 (2002); David P. Hariton, Response to “Old ‘Brine’ in 
New Bottles” (New Brine in Old Bottles), 55 TAX L. REV. 397, 397–98 (2002). 
 115 Louis Kaplow has argued that, in choosing between statutes whose details will 
be filled out primarily at the time of enactment (rules) and those whose content will 
largely be created in litigation afterwards (standards), the tax law should choose rules 
because the costs of many repeated instances of litigation will exceed the costs of one 
GALLE.FORMATTED.6.DOC 3/17/2007  2:28 PM 
382 Virginia Tax Review [Vol.  26:357 
 
This reality poses a particular problem for those who wish to 
control tax sheltering activity in a textualist era.  Remember, again, 
that the textualists’ primary complaint is with the effect of shifting 
decision-making authority from legislatures to courts.116  That shift, 
they say, means that rules may be made largely out of public sight and 
insulated from public influence.117  Changes can be initiated by a single 
litigant with an agreeable court.  And rules may reflect, not 
widespread consensus by representatives of various social interests, 
but instead the preferences of an elite and entrenched group of judges 
whose preferences may be either eclectic or not fully informed.118  The 
textualist might, conceivably, be willing to accept a statutory scheme 
that stated, flatly, that tax planning is prohibited.  That would leave 
little play for judicial discretion.  What most present codification 
proposals instead present is a mixed landscape, in which a court is 
burst of legislative energy.  Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 577 (1992).  Thus, Kaplow would likely say that Congress, 
if it is interested in efficiency, should not prefer “shortcuts,” as I have called them.  
One could argue with Kaplow’s assessment of the welfare effects of rules.  For 
instance, he is largely comparing apples and oranges, treating legislative decision 
making resources as equivalent to the resources we spend in litigation.  But one of 
those — litigation resources — is relatively limitless, while legislative resources may 
be significantly constrained by the Constitution.  We can only have so many 
legislators and there may be serious negative effects on the quality of legislative 
outputs if we cut back on the time legislators themselves (as opposed to their staffs) 
devote to each statute.  A complete welfarist analysis would have to consider whether 
Congress could create net positive welfare by conserving its own time and allocating 
budget authority for more judges. 
My point here, though, is a bit different.  I am claiming that congressmen 
themselves are likely to want to conserve their own time.  For instance, they will only 
partly internalize any of the inefficiency effects predicted by Kaplow (largely through 
the medium of voter discontent with the job they are doing), while more fully 
realizing the benefits of having time to raise money, provide constituent services, and 
enact legislation that serves their own ideological and political interests.  That 
preference has significant implications for interpretative theory.  If our goal is fidelity 
to congressional intent, however self-serving, then we likely have to follow Congress’ 
preference for standards in some instances.  If our goal, on the other hand, is to 
reform a misguided Congress and chasten it to better internalize what may be harmful 
effects of its preferences, then we have to understand the basis for those preferences.  
Either way, the basic point that Congress likely wants shortcuts is important. 
 116 See Easterbrook, supra note 67, at 536; Easterbrook, supra note 47, at 61–62.
 117 Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (Scalia, J.); Sunstein, supra 
note 69, at 416 (describing this view).
 118 See The Queen v. Canada Trustco Mortgage Co., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, at paras. 
31, 41 (Can.); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 79–80, 105–18, 136–38, 
141 (1999). 
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expected to sort between encouraged tax subsidies, discouraged tax 
planning, and tax shelters, which are to be singled out for special 
penalties.  All of this sorting is to be done based on the court’s own 
view of what a Congress, which on the face of the Code has given few 
clues, must have wanted.  The result is an obvious invitation to give 
free play to the courts’ own views about what conduct is desirable and 
whether revenue is to be given priority over private autonomy.  
Therefore the textualist likely is unsurprised that individual circuit 
courts show distinct, ideologically predictable tendencies in their 
treatment of alleged tax shelters.119
Even if we are unmoved by these criticisms, their appeal to some 
judges remains a practical problem, as the experiences of our 
Canadian neighbors have demonstrated.120  The JCT’s proposal 
includes an exception for tax benefits intended by Congress.121  The 
textualist response, in the Canadian example, is logical: the textualist 
exploits this language to upend the enterprise, reading intended by 
Congress to mean any benefit described by the literal language of the 
Code.122  The exception swallows the rule and the textualist need 
worry no longer about judicial discretion.123
Chirelstein and Zelenak themselves seem to make much the same 
point.  They worry that any effort to leave “economic substance” or 
more general anti-abuse rules to judges will simply reproduce the 
judge’s policy preferences, rather than reflect a rational nationwide 
tax policy.124  They thus appear to share with textualists some 
skepticism about the capacity for individual judges to fill statutory 
“gaps” in a way that is principled and faithful to abstract congressional 
policy aims not embodied specifically in the lexical dimension of a 
statute.  This is, of course, not an undisputed position in interpretative  
 
 119 See Hariton, supra note 23, at 23–24; Nahass, supra note 63, at 257–61; 
Sheppard, supra note 13, at 1022. 
 120 In essence, the Canadian experience was that enactment of a statutory rule 
aimed at abusive tax shelters did almost nothing to change judicial outcomes.  
Canadian courts essentially ignored the new statute and continued to read tax laws as 
they always had — as textualists.  See The Queen v. Canada Trustco Mortgage Co., 
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, at paras. 60–76 (Can.); Arnold, supra note 71, at 491–92, 497. 
 121 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 14–15. 
 122 The Queen v. Canada Trustco Mortgage Co., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, at paras. 60–
76 (Can.). 
 123 See Schler, supra note 8, at 386–87. 
 124 See Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1949, 1953; Zelenak, supra note 
39, at 185–87. 
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circles.  Professor Dworkin, among many others, would be anxious to 
disagree.125
But, again, our goal is to build a statute that will prove effective 
no matter the interpretative theory of the court in which it lands.  
Dworkin’s Hercules, and his brethren, will have no trouble sorting 
congressionally intended subsidies from tax sheltering and will trust 
their fellow principled judges to do the same.126  That achieves nicely 
the “shortcut” I mentioned at the outset of this section, conserving 
Congress’ tax statute drafting efforts and freeing more time for other 
problems.  Unfortunately, for those who are unpersuaded by 
purposivism, we have some more work to do.  “Do what Congress 
intends” will not be a satisfactory shortcut, and a Congress that relies 
on that rule alone, may see unintended and unappealing results, such 
as allowance of many tax shelters. 
Evidently, then, we need a more precise way of describing the 
difference between tax subsidy and tax shelter.  This is as much a 
conceptual challenge as a linguistic one.  Consider, for instance, the 
participation by nonprofit entities in many “shelters” in exchange for 
a modest accommodation fee.  The tax exemption is obviously 
“intended” by Congress to benefit the exempt entity.  Here, the 
accommodation fee does, indeed, leverage exemption to the entity’s 
gain.  But that gain is achieved at a disproportionately large social 
cost.  To us, it may seem irrational to spend $100 to give the exempt 
entity $1.  The textualist might say, however, that to allow courts to 
make that judgment is to open the door to saying that many other 
congressional subsidies are just as foolish. 
Once this door is open, the textualist claims, it is hard to make 
certain that only the “right” subsidies step through.  In this view, the 
difficulty in describing the limits of what it means to subsidize is that 
the societal tradeoffs that go into a political decision to subsidize are 
often necessarily implicit or incompletely theorized.  We have little 
language, and not much more theory, about what it means for a 
collective body, be it a legislature or a society, to “intend” 
something.127  Judicial efforts to fill in these gaps may be subjective 
 125 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 87, 176–275, 353–54 (1986). 
 126 Hercules is Professor Dworkin’s imaginary judge, whose considerable 
knowledge and analytical powers allow him to reach right answers even to difficult 
legal questions.  Id. at 239. 
 127 See Easterbrook, supra note 67, at 547; Manning, supra note 55, at 427; Molot, 
supra note 52, at 28; Nelson, supra note 46, at 370; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative 
History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory 
Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1300–01 (1990). 
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guesswork.128  Inevitably, then, some decisions will permit tax benefits 
to flow to transactions that many or most legislators would have 
agreed should not receive them, but which perhaps are viewed more 
sanguinely by a judge.129  As a result, it is difficult to describe 
“intended subsidy” in a way that rules out shelter hitchhikers, unless 
we think words can have only one plausible lexical meaning and we 
limit statutory “intent” to that meaning. 
Chirelstein and Zelenak helpfully suggest a way to short-circuit 
these problems.  If we simply make a list of expressly approved tax 
subsidies, or of disapproved shelters, then we can greatly reduce our 
need to describe congressional intent on the level of grand theory.130  
That is, in this scheme any tax benefit can be recognized only if 
described on the face of a statute (or, perhaps, a regulation) as an 
intended tax benefit; intention could not be inferred from context, 
implication, or analogy.  We then would have only the more 
manageable and more familiar task of making the lines demarcating 
each carve-out as bright as we want them.  Obviously there will still be 
debate around the edges.  But we greatly reduce the room for the play 
of judicial value preferences, which greatly appeases textualist 
resistors.131
Now, as I noted earlier, this approach has costs, at least from the 
legislative perspective.  It consumes large chunks of legislative time 
 128 See Easterbrook, supra note 65, at 68; Nelson, supra note 46, at 370. 
 129 See Schler, supra note 8, at 340–41; Walsh, supra note 19, at 1562–63; cf. 
ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 175–76 (2006) (arguing that error costs of judicial 
interpretation exceed any benefits); Smith, supra note 1, at 12–13 (noting difficulty of 
sorting benefits intended by Congress from those that resemble benefits intended by 
Congress). 
 130 See Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1955–56. 
 131 Cf. Weisbach, supra note 113, at 877 (observing that it might be possible to 
obtain benefits of both rules and standards by “provid[ing] a standard with safe 
harbors”).  As Ethan Yale points out in correspondence, this standard arguably does 
raise a second set of difficulties in identifying what is a tax “benefit” that must be 
staked out expressly by Congress and what is simply an ordinary application of tax 
principles.  For instance, we might dispute whether a “beneficial” treatment of basis 
in fact is a “benefit” that must be stated clearly by Congress or just a necessary 
component of determining a taxpayer’s income.  Cf. George Cooper, The Taming of 
the Shrewd: Identifying and Controlling Income Tax Avoidance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
657, 659–60 (1985) (observing difficult baseline questions in defining tax avoidance).  
To avoid these difficulties, I would suggest that we might define our baseline from 
which departures are a “benefit” not as “income,” or any other concept that might 
involve questions of tax policy, but rather simply as any determination that would 
reduce taxable income below gross revenues in the applicable tax accounting period. 
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that could be devoted to other efforts, as Congress must determine 
each item individually, and craft and agree on language that reflects 
its assumptions.  For example, Congress would have to state whether 
tax exemption applies only to income generated by engaging in 
exempt activities, and not to the profits passed through by a 
partnership created by a shelter promoter.132  It must reach consensus 
on these questions and cannot simply punt them to courts.133  Some of 
these negotiations will entail not only time but also political pain, as it 
becomes more obvious to those whose oxes are gored who has done 
the goring.  Many efforts will initially be over- or under-inclusive and 
demand repeated revisions, especially as underlying facts in the world 
change.134  To the textualist, of course, these are not costs at all, but 
gains.  They are precisely what textualism is supposed to produce — 
more deliberation, more transparency, and less legislation. 
In sum, Chirelstein and Zelenak, although they do not frame their 
plan in quite this way, offer us a solution to what would otherwise be a 
crippling problem.  Many views of interpretative theory would force 
the interpreter to balk at allowing judges to sort shelter from subsidy.  
Yet, unless Congress is to write every line of the Code with the utmost 
care and inhuman foresight, judges will be called upon to sort.  The 
default rule device lifts much of the weight of those sorting decisions 
from the court — although, of course, not all of it.135  Congress then 
can conserve its efforts, giving ordinary attention to most tax statutes 
and devoting heightened thought and deliberation to the rules 
affecting “opt-in” or “opt-out” provisions that are especially 
important to it.  And these default provisions, by virtue of being 
interpretatively palatable to many different judges, are more likely to 
be heeded. 
B.  Why Stop There? 
A key aspect of the analysis in the last section is that it does not 
seem to depend on the structure of the background anti-shelter rule.  
 132 See Surrey, supra note 39, at 707 n.31. 
 133 See WALDRON, supra note 118, at 80. 
 134 I note that a classic solution for many of these problems is to allow agencies to 
fill in the gaps and make the fine-grained adjustments that better implement an 
imperfect statute.  This solution would reduce error costs, but arguably also reduce 
transparency.  This article is agnostic about whether the Service would have the 
power to alter or authoritatively interpret the list of intended tax subsidies. 
 135 See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2040–48 (2002). 
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Chirelstein and Zelenak deploy their opt-in/opt-out idea as a way to 
permit some but not all transactions with no real economic loss to get 
beneficial tax treatment, without having to retreat from their stance 
that courts should not be obliged to guess at congressional intent.  But 
there is no obvious reason why the same idea would not work even in 
the absence of their suggested bright-line rule prohibiting deductions 
in the absence of real economic losses. 
Indeed, the opt-in/opt-out plan might make the economic 
substance doctrine, or other broad anti-abuse rules, more appealing 
than the Chirelstein and Zelenak proposal as a whole.  Suppose our 
primary concerns about the economic substance doctrine were tied to 
judicial reluctance to employ it, rather than to any doubts about its 
content.136  We might then enact a codified doctrine that directs courts 
to disallow tax benefits for a transaction that lacks economic 
substance, unless that transaction was specifically identified by 
Congress as one that should receive favorable treatment.  For courts 
that would be reluctant to punish shelter activity, that rule — the opt-
in rule — deprives them of the argument that the literal text of the 
statute (text that does not contain an express declaration that this 
form of transaction is intended for subsidy) exemplifies an implicit 
congressional “intention” to allow the taxpayer a deduction or other 
benefit.  And, perhaps more importantly, we have enacted an 
economic substance “standard” in a way that is intellectually satisfying 
to judges across the spectrum of interpretative theory. 
Thus, assuming that the economic substance doctrine itself is 
fairly determinate, the result is to remove much of the wiggle room for 
importing judicial notions of good tax policy.  That was one of the 
central goals we identified for Chirelstein and Zelenak’s proposal.  
But we have achieved it across a much wider, and more malleable, 
range of possible abusive transactions.  Our only remaining challenge 
is to find a formulation of the economic substance doctrine that 
justifies our assumption.  I return to that problem in a moment. 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONTENT OF A CODIFIED DOCTRINE 
My analysis so far has two main implications.  First, interpretative 
theory shows us that there are good reasons for codifying the 
 136 In other words, in this hypothetical, we are reasonably confident that it will 
usually be obvious when a transaction has economic substance and when it does not.  
I use the subjunctive voice in the text here because I recognize that this is an 
assumption contrary to fact; one of our big worries about the doctrine is that its 
content is sometimes hard to predict.  I return to this problem shortly. 
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economic substance doctrine.  Codification could overcome the 
reservations of textualist judges.  It would also allow Congress the 
opportunity to enact a default rule that would deal with some of the 
policy objections of textualists, while preserving Congress’ flexibility 
in drafting most portions of the Code.  In this part, I want to develop 
another implication: there is a good argument that the preceding 
suggests not only a form for the economic substance doctrine but also 
its content.  In particular, by using clear statement rules, we can 
remove what is probably the most persuasive argument against David 
Weisbach’s suggestion that shelter regulation should aim to curtail all 
tax planning.137  That, in turn, suggests that any codified doctrine 
should likely target transactions subjectively motivated in significant 
part by tax considerations. 
A.  In Favor of a Strong Conjunctive Test 
A continuing source of debate among courts is whether the 
economic substance test has both objective and subjective 
components.  That is, while some courts say that the test can be 
satisfied either by the presence of objective economic substance or a 
subjective business purpose for engaging in the transaction, others 
require both.138  The most recent codification proposals from both the 
Senate and the JCT would require a “conjunctive” test — that is, they 
would require both.139  What is unclear is why.  Our discussion in Part 
IV, in combination with important work by others, suggests a strong 
reason for requiring that taxpayers receive favorable tax treatment 
only for transactions in which their main objective is a nontax 
purpose. 
As I said, I believe my analysis in Part IV fills a hole in what 
otherwise is a highly convincing set of claims by David Weisbach 
about the ideal content of tax shelter regulations.140  Since he has 
already laid his argument out in detail, I only summarize it here.  
Weisbach’s argument, as I read it, proceeds from the fairly 
uncontroversial premise that the content of any shelter strategy 
should follow from its purposes.141  From a purely welfarist 
perspective, the primary goals of the tax system are to raise revenue 
for government while incurring a minimum of economic distortions 
 137 Weisbach, supra note 38, at 222–25. 
 138 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 6–7. 
 139 See supra note 13. 
 140 Weisbach, supra note 38. 
 141 Id. at 222. 
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that reduce society’s productivity.142  Both of these goals are best 
served by a tax system that discourages “tax planning” — that is, 
arranging one’s affairs so as to minimize tax burdens.143
While the effects of tax planning on revenue are obvious, its 
downside for social welfare perhaps bears a bit more examination.  
Most obviously, tax incentives distort efficient market behavior and 
tax planning distracts the planners from doing something more 
productive with their time.144  I would add that inefficient tax 
distortions can be magnified by social norms and QWERTY effects.  
That is, sometimes we act the way we do because that is how we 
conclude we are expected to behave145 or because we have invested in 
a way that depends on existing arrangements.146  So distortions caused 
initially by a tax effect can influence behavior even generations later 
or in industries not affected directly by the tax.  The costs of these 
distortions are almost literally incalculable. 
It follows from these premises that at least the ideal goal of anti-
shelter regulations should be to curtail tax planning.147  That is, we 
should not simply aim to prevent revenue losses.  We also should 
 142 Id. at 234, 241; Weisbach, supra note 113, at 870.  I put aside fairness 
considerations here mostly because in the shelter context they often are question-
begging.  For instance, we all probably agree that similarly situated taxpayers should 
have comparable duties to pay tax, but that simply frames a further debate about 
whether merely technical compliance with the Internal Revenue Code (Code) puts a 
taxpayer in the same position as one who complies in both the technical and some 
other sense. 
 143 Weisbach, supra note 38, at 223–25.  My analysis here presumes that 
Congress, as an entity that more nearly internalizes society-wide costs and benefits 
than any individual private actor, will be a better judge of efficient or fairly 
distributive rules than potential tax avoiders.  In other words, I assume that it is 
unlikely that tax rules will themselves be inefficient in a way that could be mitigated 
by tax planning. 
 144 See id. at 222–23, 232, 236; Thompson, supra note 25, at 782. 
 145 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 
J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 539–40 (1998); Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, 
J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1989, at 99, 99–100. 
 146 See W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, SCI. AM., Feb. 1990, 
at 92, 95; Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 
332, 332 (1985); Paul Krugman, History and Industry Location: The Case of the 
Manufacturing Belt, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 80, 80 (1991).  This effect may be increased 
by cognitive biases in favor of existing arrangements.  See James A. Fanto, Quasi-
Rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in Merger Decision-Making, 62 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1333, 1360 (2001). 
 147 Except, of course, for tax planning that would in fact increase revenue, social 
welfare, or both.  More on this in a moment. 
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attempt to discourage socially wasteful efforts to minimize tax.148  
Because of a long tradition of rhetoric in favor of a taxpayer’s “right” 
to engage in tax planning,149 it perhaps is fair to say that most anti-
shelter efforts have focused on the revenue side, with at most only 
incidental attention to whether they will also affect tax planning. 
Taking this analysis one step further, we might conclude that any 
codification of the economic substance doctrine should prohibit 
favorable treatment for transactions motivated in any large part by tax 
considerations.150  That rule aims most directly at both of the problems 
we want to prevent and reaches them in ways that a purely objective 
test might not.  For example, markets improve and react through 
experimentation, and there may be many objectively reasonable ways 
to do business.  If businesses select among what look at present to be 
relatively interchangeable options based on tax considerations rather 
than out of an effort to improve, we lose much of the motor that 
drives business experimentation and reduce market adaptability. 
There are two main sets of arguments against this reasoning.  The 
first is that there are putatively insurmountable evidentiary problems 
in establishing subjective motivation.151  In many respects, though, 
requiring subjective business purpose in every case will make the 
Government’s life easier.  Evidence that a taxpayer bought a 
promoted tax shelter will likely amount to conclusive proof that the 
tax benefit should be disallowed — because, among other reasons, 
most fact-finders probably will conclude it is unlikely that the 
promoted tax shelter happened to be just the kind of investment 
vehicle for which the taxpayer was looking.152  While some taxpayers 
may invent documents to support bogus business purposes, the 
possibility of “smoking gun” e-mails that will foreclose any business 
purpose argument (plus the threat of convictions for obstruction of 
justice) may outweigh this danger in the long run.153  And making 
taxpayer motive relevant in every case will give taxpayers a strong 
 148 See Weisbach, supra note 38, at 252. 
 149 See Hariton, supra note 23, at 7; Weisbach, supra note 38, at 220 (describing 
the tradition). 
 150 See Weisbach, supra note 38, at 251–53. 
 151 Cf. Bankman, supra note 1, at 27–28 (considering whether it is difficult for 
taxpayers to create fake evidence of nontax subjective intent); Weisbach, supra note 
38, at 236–37, 253 (noting that determining motive may be costly). 
 152 Cf. Weisbach, supra note 38, at 253 (arguing that it is obvious that several 
famous shelters were tax-motivated). 
 153 See I.R.C. § 7212(a) (making any corrupt effort to “impede[] the due 
administration of” the Code a felony). 
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incentive to be as transparent as possible with the Service about their 
tax position, because any evidence of concealment could easily be 
read by a finder of fact as evidence of tax planning.154  In any event, 
the burden of proof critique is, at most, an argument for the Service 
and the Justice Department to be choosy about in which cases they 
elect to proceed.  The law has both norming and deterrence effects155 
and may thereby curb subjectively motivated shelter activity even if 
enforced as such only rarely.156
The more potent critique, then, is that some tax planning is 
desirable.  Michael Schler and others, in their various responses to 
Weisbach and elsewhere, raise what is for us now a familiar problem: 
there are some tax rules designed specifically to encourage behavior 
that might not result from an unregulated market.157  But that is no 
reason to welcome all tax planning.  The challenge is to find a reliable 
and administrable tool for sorting desirable from undesirable 
planning.  As we have seen, the challenge is substantial; the price of 
failure is a potential for highly over- or under-inclusive enforcement.  
However, as we have also seen, a clear statement rule for intended tax 
benefits could well be the tool we need to mitigate those problems.158  
 154 See Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499–500 (1943). 
 155 See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 349, 361–65 (1997); Tracey L. Meares et al., Updating the Study of 
Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1182–83 (2004).  But cf. Robert Weisberg, Norms 
and Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 467 (2003) (critiquing strong predictive claims of other analyses of 
effect of law and punishment on social norms). 
 156 See Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation 
Tax Shelter Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 957 (2006); Weisbach, supra 
note 38, at 245. 
 157 See Beller, supra note 33, at 5; Hariton, supra note 23, at 15, 20; Joseph 
Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 876 
(1982); McMahon, supra note 20, at 205–06; James M. Peaslee, More Thoughts on 
Proposed Economic Substance Clarification, 99 TAX NOTES 747 (May 5, 2003); Schler, 
supra note 8, at 329, 340, 385–86 (arguing that Weisbach overlooks that some tax 
planning is encouraged by Congress); see also Bankman, supra note 1, at 13 
(observing that the economic substance doctrine cannot logically be applied to 
subsidies intended by Congress); Daniel N. Shaviro, Evaluating the Social Costs of 
Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 445, 450–51 (2002) (positing that tax planning 
to comply even with arbitrary tax rules may have some societal usefulness). 
 158 See supra text accompanying notes 134–37. 
David Hariton also argues that Weisbach confuses the tax shelter issue by failing 
to suggest a yardstick for distinguishing between unwanted tax planning and truly 
egregious planning meriting some additional penalty.  Hariton, supra note 23, at 6–8, 
32.  In a sense, this is true.  Once we are willing to say that we should resist all tax 
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For example, Congress could carve out a list of expressly specified 
tax-favored transactions that would be exempt from re-
characterization even if engaged in unreasonably or for tax-avoidance 
purposes. 
Thus, with the addition of a clear-statement rule addendum, there 
seems to be no strong argument against a codified doctrine that 
condemns subjectively tax-motivated transactions. 
B.  In or Out?  An Aside 
This presents the additional question whether the default setting 
for our clear statement rule should be subsidy or no subsidy.  The 
logic of clear statement rules suggests that we should put the burden 
of overcoming legislative inertia on the position we think presently is 
over-produced, or at least under-deliberated, in the legislative 
process.159  For the most part, I have argued, tax planning is societally 
wasteful.  Yet there are few checks on tax subsidies, especially largely 
hidden subsidies, such as special rules for accelerated depreciation 
and deferred or equity-based compensation.  Interest groups may use 
the tax system, which is arcane and largely obscure from public sight 
to begin with, as a way to hide from voters at large the benefits for 
which they lobby and reap for themselves.160  Public choice theory 
predicts that, in situations like that, the interest group will win more 
often than the political marketplace would otherwise dictate; 
information costs and other collective action barriers, magnified by 
manipulation of obscure tax provisions, result in rents for the interest 
group.161
This is not to say that tax subsidies are always pernicious and 
inefficient.  But there does seem to be a plausible case that they are 
over-produced and would greatly benefit from a rule that makes their 
production not only more difficult, but also more transparent, so that 
the political market can operate itself to check them more effectively.   
planning, it becomes difficult to single out some subset of it that we find especially 
worthy of condemnation.  That problem is easy to avoid, simply by exposing all tax 
planning to the same risks. 
 159 Galle, supra note 102, at 184–85. 
 160 See Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget 
Process and the Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 930–31 (1999). 
 161 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS 
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 21, 35 (1971); Jonathan R. Macy, Promoting Public-
Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 223, 229 (1986). 
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The “opt-in” default rule I have described helps us to move in that 
direction. 
C.  Back to Standards 
We are left with one loose end, albeit a very significant one.  It is 
one thing, in theory, to recognize that we ought to target subjective 
tax planning motivations.  It is another to determine whether as a 
practical matter any judicially-administered system with that goal can 
be consistent and predictable enough to be worth its costs.  For 
example, as I have noted, one major reason Chirelstein and Zelenak 
are disenchanted with the economic substance doctrine is that they do 
not think that it can deter determined tax avoiders.162  If we agreed 
with that view, we might prefer their bright-line technique as a 
second-best method for reaching inefficient tax planning.  As I explain 
here, though, the evidence for their claim is, at best, uncertain. 
More or less everyone who has ever written about the economic 
substance doctrine has a different view about its deterrent effects on 
taxpayers.  Chirelstein and Zelenak, as I said, believe that very 
aggressive tax planners, and especially their clients, can be dissuaded 
from their enterprise only by a bright-line rule that leaves essentially 
no doubt that the transaction available to them will not work.163  At 
 162 See Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1948, 1953. 
 163 See id.  It would be interesting to know whether Chirelstein and Zelenak 
agree with the Government that the KPMG shelter promoters are criminally liable 
for promoting their “FLIP” and “BLIPS.”  The Government’s theory of the case, 
according to the indictment, appears to be that the economic substance doctrine made 
it so obvious that these shelters would not work that the individual KPMG defendants 
had to have known for certain that their efforts to sell them would violate a “known 
legal duty.”  Superseding Indictment at 17, 25–26, United States v. Stein, No. 05-CR-
0888 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2005) (alleging that defendants’ internal communications 
revealed that they knew shelters would not survive court challenges and were “close 
to frivolous”); see Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (holding that 
proof of a “voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty” is an element of tax 
evasion); United States v. Gurary, 860 F.2d 521, 525 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that tax 
willfulness is an element of the crime of conspiracy to evade tax).  Yet Chirelstein and 
Zelenak appear to posit that the economic substance doctrine cannot produce that 
level of certainty about a tax transaction.  In correspondence, Professor Zelenak 
noted that the Government also alleges that some of the promoted shelters were truly 
shams — that is, the transactions that should have provided tax relief were not 
genuinely as represented.  E.g., Superseding Indictment, supra, at 16, 21–23 (alleging 
that defendants in fact controlled supposedly “unrelated” parties to some 
transactions, misrepresented independence of other participants in transactions and 
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the same time, a number of other commentators — mostly 
practitioners, it should be noted — claim that the uncertainty of the 
doctrine overdeters innocent conduct, producing more social costs 
than it saves.164  Professor Weisbach observes, aptly, that which of 
these views is right is ultimately an empirical question for which we 
have no current data.165  Notwithstanding his warning, I will hazard 
here a few additional thoughts. 
First, it is not quite true that we have no data.  For one thing, we 
have the lessons of history, although I agree that in the end they are 
inconclusive.  Our early experiences with the law of corporate 
reorganizations presented an experience very similar to Chirelstein 
and Zelenak’s proposal.  On first enactment, the reorganization 
provisions were fairly sketchy.166  Business taxpayers took advantage 
of Congress’ imprecise drafting and inexperience to pay very little 
tax.167  Congress responded with, in essence, a super-detailed code, 
attempting to deal with every possible situation that might arise.168  It 
was an enormous failure; tax revenues from the affected industries 
barely moved.169  It was only Learned Hand, and later the Supreme 
Court, whose early invocations of the economic substance doctrine 
convinced taxpayers that they would have to pay or risk serious 
penalties.170  But we have to be careful with our history.171  Is our 
lesson that detailed rules can never work and standards do?  Or is our 
lesson that the particular code that Congress wrote in the 1920s failed, 
claimed falsely that some transactions had a potential for profit).  That would provide 
an alternative ground for conviction whatever one’s view of the legal determinacy of 
the economic substance doctrine. 
 164 See Beller, supra note 33, at 3, 5 (summarizing American Bar Association 
Section of Taxation comments); Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner’s Perspective on 
Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in 
Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47 (2001); Alan Gunn, The Use and Misuse of 
Antiabuse Rules: Lessons from the Partnership Antiabuse Regulations, 54 SMU L. 
REV. 159 (2001); David P. Hariton, How to Fix Economic Substance, 2003 TNT 82-33, 
539–40 (Apr. 29, 2003). 
 165 Weisbach, supra note 38, at 248; see also Aprill, supra note 13, at 34. 
 166 “Sketchy,” of course, is a highly scientific interpretative term.  I derive this 
discussion of the history from Steven A. Bank, Codifying Judicial Doctrines: No Cure 
for Rules but More Rules?, 54 SMU L. REV. 37 (2001). 
 167 Id. at 42. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at 44. 
 171 Cf. Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 
95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 526 (1995) (warning of what the author perceives as lawyers’ 
misuses of historical analysis). 
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perhaps despite a level of detail that would otherwise be a virtue?  
With our one data point, we do not really know. 
Another important source of data, though, is our reports from 
other commentators about who is likely to respond to the incentive 
effects of the doctrine in the manner they predict.  Professor Zelenak 
says that very aggressive shelter promoters and their customers need 
bright-line rules.172  Schler, Hariton, and others predict that sober and 
careful members of the tax bar (like themselves) might be scared off 
of good transactions by overly broad judicial doctrines.173  Both camps 
could easily be right, and neither seems to be making strong 
predictions about the group described by the other camp.  Quite 
possibly, the same set of rules will have different effects on different 
planners. 
Supposing that both sets of predictions were right, what would be 
the net outcome for society as a whole?  Here, again, we have 
Weisbach’s point that we do not know the relative size of either group 
or the magnitude of the costs or benefits that we could produce by 
designing a rule aimed at them.174  We would like to think that there 
are more thoughtful and careful tax planners, and we suspect that 
many aggressive planners will do what they do regardless of what the 
rules are, bright or otherwise.175  But we still do not know the 
magnitude of the costs on either side.  Neither group is likely to tell us 
honestly and the “gap” between tax due and tax actually collected is 
hard to measure.176
In the best tradition of nonempiricist law professors everywhere, 
though, I am going to guess, or rather, predict, that the net societal 
effects of a flexible economic substance doctrine will be positive.  I 
 172 Zelenak, supra note 39, at 187. 
 173 See Beller, supra note 33, at 3; Boyle, supra note 33, at 10; Kenneth W. 
Gideon, Tax Law Works Best when the Rules Are Clear, 81 TAX NOTES 999, 1001 
(Nov. 23, 1998); Kenneth J. Kies, A Critical Look at “Corporate Tax Shelter” 
Proposals, 83 TAX NOTES 1463 (June 7, 1999); Schler, supra note 8, at 383. 
 174 Weisbach, supra note 38, at 249.  I assume here that it would be impractical, at 
the very least from a political perspective, to design a rule that on its face treated 
transactions by the two groups differently.  We should keep in mind, though, that 
reputational effects for repeat-player tax advisors might permit the Service to, in 
effect, apply a different standard to aggressive lawyers.  And, importantly, the lawyers 
might well know that fact in advance.  Thus, we could mitigate a rule written to deter 
aggressive planning by treating careful advisors generously on audit, reducing the 
danger of over-deterrence for their clients.  I am grateful to Ethan Yale for making 
this point. 
 175 See Eustice, supra note 114, at 136; Hariton, supra note 114, at 402. 
 176 See McMahon, supra note 20, at 207–08; Weisbach, supra note 38, at 243–44. 
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think it is true that a flexible doctrine will have a deterrent effect on 
careful advisors, but will not over-deter.  I frankly do not understand 
the claims of over-deterrence, given that the Service offers private 
letter rulings in advance of a proposed transaction.177  So the doctrine 
will prevent many borderline transactions the Service says it believes 
do not “work.”178  My guess is that the revenue and anti-distortionary 
benefits from that effect will swamp any losses that we might see from 
the doctrine’s failure to present aggressive planners with a big enough 
stop sign.  Planners who are attentive to rules are more sensitive to 
the rules’ deterrent effects.179  Further, the Service is likely to discover 
on audit “abusive” transactions by both groups at about the same 
rate,180 but the thoughtful planners will win in litigation much more 
often — because, after all, they are a lot more thoughtful and their 
transactions will not be as clearly wrong.181  Thus, if I am right that 
there are more careful planners, the revenue savings from preventing 
careful planners from recommending these transactions in the first 
place ought to exceed the costs from generating more such 
transactions from aggressive planners.182
Another factor we have to consider is the likelihood that not all 
economic substance doctrines are created equal.  Although it is true 
that the doctrine’s performance in the past has been uneven,183 future 
 177 Cf. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1960 (noting that Congress could 
mitigate over-deterrence problems by expanding advance ruling programs).  In 
addition, as I described, see supra note 174, the Service can easily give either explicit 
or implicit assurances to reputable counsel that their clients will not face the harshest 
penalties for good faith but invalid transactions. 
 178 See Eustice, supra note 114, at 165; Thompson, supra note 25, at 782; 
Weisbach, supra note 38, at 249–50. 
 179 See Schler, supra note 8, at 385–86; Thompson, supra note 25, at 782. 
 180 This seems a dubious presumption, considering that careful planners, one 
might think, would be more likely to disclose their transactions to the Service rather 
than hide them.  The game theory of disclosure, however, is very complicated.  If an 
aggressive planner believes that disclosed transactions receive less scrutiny, she may 
well advise her client to disclose.  The Service may respond to this tactic by shifting 
more scrutiny back to disclosed transactions, and so on.  My prediction therefore 
assumes that there will likely be an equilibrium point at which disclosed and 
undisclosed transactions are discovered on audit at roughly the same rate. 
 181 Cf. George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a 
Lesson from History, 54 SMU L. REV. 209, 223 (2001) (noting “comparative resource 
advantage” large corporate taxpayers have over government). 
 182 See Schler, supra note 8, at 384.  It is also worth keeping in mind here that a 
subjective intent standard will be fairly fatal to mass-marketed shelters, so that each 
transaction is likely to apply only to one or a small number of taxpayers. 
 183 See Sheppard, supra note 13, at 7–8; Thompson, supra note 25, at 782.  For an 
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results might well be much better.  For one thing, we will have fixed a 
major hole in the “subjective,” business-purpose half of the test.  
Before, courts struggled to define business purpose against a 
backdrop of repeated claims that there is a “right” to tax planning.184  
We now can dispense with that difficulty by the expedient of making 
clear that there is no such right. 
On the objective end, we can probably do better than the welter 
of existing rules, most of which seem to require some element of 
market risk.185  As others have shrewdly observed, this simply leads to 
ever-more difficult questions about just how much “risk” a transaction 
must include to have objective “substance.”186  Since the only real 
purpose for requiring risk is to make it somewhat harder to create a 
shelter,187 the test inherently was undefinable.  Whether a given 
amount of risk was “enough” depended on our view of just how 
difficult it should be to engage in tax avoidance, a question that 
necessarily varied from judge to judge.188  The Senate’s recent 
formulation, in my view, is much better.  The Senate would find 
economic substance only if: 
(I) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from 
Federal tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and (II) 
the taxpayer has a substantial nontax purpose for entering 
into such transaction and the transaction is a reasonable 
means of accomplishing such purpose.189
impressive torturing of one respected iteration of the rule, see Hariton, supra note 23, 
at 17–20. 
 184 See Weisbach, supra note 113, at 869–70 n.25 (describing “the culture of tax 
compliance”). 
 185 See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594, 604–05 (6th Cir. 2006); 
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778, 787 (5th Cir. 2001); UPS of 
Am., Inc. v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018–19 (11th Cir. 2001); IES Indus., Inc. v. 
United States, 253 F.3d 350, 355 (8th Cir. 2001); ACM P’ship v. Commissioner, 157 
F.3d 231, 248–50 (3d Cir. 1998); Gilman v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 
1991); Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 94–95 (4th Cir. 1985); 
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 254, 284–85 (1999), aff’d per 
curiam, 254 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 
U.S. 561, 577, 583 (1978) (pointing to risk borne by taxpayer as one element 
supporting its claim that transaction possessed economic substance). 
 186 Beller, supra note 33, at 3, 5; Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1949–50. 
 187 See Bankman, supra note 1, at 18–20; Hariton, supra note 23, at 31–32. 
 188 Cf. Dow Chem., 435 F.3d at 602 n.13 (rejecting dissenting opinion’s proposed 
approach to possibility-of-profit test because it would have been “too easily met”). 
 189 S. 3777, 109th Cong. § 201(a) (2006). 
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Prong two here in fact covers not only the taxpayer’s subjective 
motivation.  To tell the truth, prong two is a bit weak on that front; it 
would be better to target any substantial tax planning motivation, for 
the reasons I have already given.  The objective form of the 
transaction also matters.  It could, for example, prevent tax benefits 
for a transaction in which a reasonable businessperson would not have 
engaged if not for tax reasons.190
This version improves dramatically over the old attempts by 
setting out a standard that actually has a single answer, albeit one that 
may sometimes be hard to measure.191  More significantly, unlike the 
old tests, taxpayers know the answer before they engage in the 
transaction, because they know whether they, as reasonable people, 
would do the deal if not for the tax component.192  That means the 
results of the test will be much more predictable for the people it is 
aimed at deterring.  Putting the objective and subjective 
improvements together, the revised doctrine may well be rather more 
 190 This prong of the proposal apparently aims at codifying David Hariton’s 
reading of the ACM holding, in which “[a] complicated way of investing cash lacks 
economic substance — even though it obviously produces a profit — if it leaves the 
taxpayer in substantially the same position as if the cash had been left in the bank.”  
David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235, 
235–36 (1999). 
 191 Professor Zelenak is skeptical of this approach, arguing that we cannot 
determine whether a taxpayer’s use of its funds is reasonable, because we do not 
know what its alternative investment opportunities were.  Zelenak, supra note 39, at 
182.  Perhaps.  But most shelters require at least one other party, who rarely is 
unaware of the tax benefits its cooperation is furnishing to the counterparty.  This 
means the tax benefits must be shared.  As a result, the test would allow us in many 
cases to show that a taxpayer incurred very large administrative costs (read: fees to 
the shelter facilitator) relative to other investments of similar risk and expected 
return.  And, costs aside, it will often be easy to show that there were many 
investment vehicles of similar return that were not nearly as complex in their 
structure.  Part of the test, as I read it, is whether a reasonable businessperson would 
have undertaken the same investment in the same (complicated, but tax-favored) 
way.  Maybe creative tax planners will invent new shelters that are simple and cheap.  
But if there were many of those around today, we would not be taking in much tax 
revenue. 
Michael Schler also attacks the idea of a standard in which favorable tax 
treatment would be denied to “a normal business transaction carried on in a peculiar 
manner solely for tax savings.”  Schler, supra note 8, at 340–42.  Schler’s main 
argument is that such a rule would unfairly infringe on ordinary tax planning.  Id. at 
384–85.  I have already dealt with those claims. 
 192 Cf. Weisbach, supra note 113, at 882 (“A transaction entered into without 
regard for the tax system, for a true business purpose, is not likely to face any 
significant uncertainty because of anti-abuse rules.”). 
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predictable than previous commentators have assumed in drawing 
their conclusions. 
For example, this version of the economic substance doctrine 
would have dealt readily with the facts in Frank Lyon Co. v. United 
States.193  In that case, the taxpayer, the Frank Lyon Company, was an 
intermediary (after winning a bidding competition) in a financing 
arrangement between a bank and another lender to build a new 
branch for the bank, where the bank was prohibited by regulations 
from engaging the financing directly.194  Frank Lyon Company made a 
down payment of $500,000, took nominal ownership of the branch and 
received depreciation deductions.195  The bank paid “rent” to Frank 
Lyon exactly equal to Frank Lyon’s interest and principal mortgage 
payments, which the bank was able to deduct in full.  The bank had 
the option to purchase the building by paying off the remaining 
mortgage, repaying the $500,000 down payment, and paying Frank 
Lyon six percent interest on the $500,000.196  As Justice Stevens 
observed in dissent, in effect the bank had simply taken out first and 
second mortgages and received from Frank Lyon a costless put 
option.197  Frank Lyon also gave the bank at least $100,000 in other 
benefits.198  The Court apparently found this transaction deeply 
difficult to unravel, citing some twenty-six separate factors that went 
into its holding.199  Just how these twenty-six factors play out in other 
cases is, to put it mildly, not self-evident.200
But under the standard I propose here, or one like it, we can stop 
once we conclude that what happened, in essence, was that several 
parties bid on the opportunity to put the bank’s depreciation 
deductions to better use than the bank.  That this may have had 
limited effects on the Treasury, as the Court noted,201 matters little to 
us; we are concerned that we may have generated a deal that would 
not likely have occurred — at least with Frank Lyon as the 
counterparty — if not for the tax considerations.  Even aside from the 
subjective evidence — for example, the bidding war and Frank Lyon’s 
 193 435 U.S. 561 (1978). 
 194 Id. at 563–65. 
 195 Id. at 565–66. 
 196 Id. at 566–68. 
 197 Id. at 585, 587 n.7 (Steven, J., dissenting). 
 198 Id. at 565. 
 199 Id. at 582–83. 
 200 For one of many efforts at deciphering Frank Lyon, see Joshua D. Rosenberg, 
Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REV. 365, 433–39 (1988). 
 201 Frank Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 580 n.15. 
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past history of having never engaged in this sort of investment — the 
evidence on the objective side that this was not a transaction in which 
an ordinary businessperson would engage, but for tax, was quite 
strong.  For one thing, there was the $100,000 sweetener Frank Lyon 
threw in — an awfully large sum to get a six percent return on 
$500,000.  Then there was the cost, unquantified by the Court, of the 
put option Frank Lyon granted the bank.  Taken together, those look 
not like ordinary investment costs, but instead like disproportionately 
outsized transaction costs of just the kind our method would target: 
those that evidence a slicing of the tax-benefit pie, rather than a pure 
market-motivated investment.  Frank Lyon, and other complex cases 
like it, can become simple and predictable under a well-drawn statute. 
Finally, we also have some methods for softening any over-
deterrence costs.  One way that comes to mind would be to give the 
Service some authority to grant in advance broad exemptions at least 
from shelter-related penalties.  No tax rule will ever be entirely clear, 
including our proposed economic substance codification.202  There 
may be some danger that businesses will hesitate to engage even in 
subjectively tax-neutral transactions for fear that the Service will 
characterize them as penalizable tax planning.203  Thus, I would also 
propose giving the Service regulatory authority to define safe harbors, 
transactions that fall within a defined congressional tax subsidy.  Good 
faith efforts to qualify for a congressionally-intended benefit, or for a 
Service-defined version of those benefits, would not be subject to 
penalties, although the Service would have the power to re-
characterize the transaction if it in fact failed to qualify.  Again, 
though, I freely concede that even with this mitigating rule my 
prediction is largely guess-work. 
Even if  I am wrong (as seems reasonably likely) and we have no 
particularly good information about the deterrent effects of any 
particular form of shelter regulation, there are some reasons to put 
the burden of proof on Chirelstein and Zelenak to show that bright-
line rules are clearly better than judge-enforced standards.  As I 
suggested before, their approach, although innovative and 
tremendously insightful, has some costs not associated with a more 
flexible doctrine. 
First, the economic substance doctrine is rather broader in its 
coverage than the set of Chirelstein and Zelenak rules, in that it could 
 202 Cf. Bankman, supra note 1, at 19 (“The tax rules are not self-executing; that is, 
the rules do not provide a single, apparent result for every economic transaction.”). 
 203 See Canellos, supra note 164, at 50–51. 
GALLE.FORMATTED.6.DOC 3/17/2007  2:28 PM 
2006] Interpretative Theory 401 
 
also by its terms cover pure timing manipulations.204  It could, in other 
words, have the effect of reversing Cottage Savings Ass’n v. 
Commissioner,205 so that transactions designed to accelerate the 
realization of real losses could still be disallowed.  Chirelstein and 
Zelenak note that, in their view, mis-timing is not a significant 
problem, and perhaps it is right that the possible dollar costs to the 
Treasury are smaller in each transaction.206  But the timing of losses is 
not only about the time value of money; it also often incorporates 
significant administrative concerns.  For example, consider the rules 
prohibiting the recognition of built-in losses on boot207 received from 
or property contributed to a controlled corporation,208 where in the 
absence of a genuine arm’s length transaction, valuation problems 
become very significant.209  In a deeper sense, questions of timing may 
reflect not simply matters of practical administration but rather 
fundamental views about the proper temporal frame of reference for 
questions of distributive justice.210
The other modest weakness of Chirelstein and Zelenak’s proposal 
is that it is, like a flu vaccine, effective for this generation of virus only.  
Its relatively bright-line rules seem to me to be fairly stable targets for 
would-be tax planners to avoid.  Whatever it gains in certainty and 
ease of administration, it loses in its capacity to adapt to innovative 
forms of shelter planning.211  But that, of course, is the tradeoff in any 
 204 Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1960–61. 
 205 499 U.S. 554 (1991). 
 206 Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1960–61; see also Bankman, supra note 
1, at 21–22 (predicting that courts will be less troubled by timing shelters).  But cf. 
Eustice, supra note 114, at 142, 156 (describing harms of timing shelters); Charlene 
Davis Luke, Beating the “Wrap”: The Agency Effort to Control Wraparound 
Insurance Tax Shelters, 25 VA. TAX REV. 129, 144–65 (2005) (describing deferral value 
of “wraparound” insurance shelters). 
 207 “Boot,” for those with only a passing acquaintance with colorful tax jargon, is 
a term for any property other than stock (usually cash) provided to shareholders in an 
otherwise tax-free exchange of shareholder property for stock in the controlled 
company (or, in various forms of corporate reorganizations, nonstock property 
provided to shareholders of the acquired or divided company).  See generally BORIS I. 
BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS ¶¶ 3.05, 11.10, 12.42[1][b] (7th ed. 2004). 
 208 I.R.C. § 351(a), (b)(2). 
 209 See Fred B. Brown, “Complete” Accrual Taxation, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1559, 1603–04 (1996); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don’t Need Another 
Hero, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 397, 407, 409 (1987). 
 210 Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 
920–36 (2005). 
 211 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 18; Eustice, supra 
GALLE.FORMATTED.6.DOC 3/17/2007  2:28 PM 
402 Virginia Tax Review [Vol.  26:357 
 
choice of a rule over a standard.212
In the face of these costs, I think we should expect some showing 
that tax shelter rules in fact produce more social welfare than tax 
shelter standards.  And I do not think the data are there to make that 
claim.  As of now, it looks likely that a flexible, judicially-interpreted 
economic substance doctrine, strengthened by some elements of the 
Chirelstein and Zelenak proposal, is superior to relying on bright-line 
silver bullets. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The tax shelter problem is a large beast.  No single paper, and 
certainly not one of this size, can do it justice.  But several worthwhile 
points emerge in the analysis here.  Most significantly, I think, this 
discussion makes clear that textualism is likely not an inevitable 
barrier for codification efforts.  If our preference is for standards, 
rather than rules that can ultimately be gamed by crafty counsel, we 
should not give up the fight out of fear of the recalcitrant textualist.  
Another point is that sometimes the best way to answer a big question 
is to make it bigger.  While commentators fret about the challenges in 
distinguishing shelters from other tax planning, and how to describe 
that difference in an administrable statute, the answer may be that 
there is no reason even to try to draw the distinction. 
I have just explained, in the last part of the preceding section, the 
most concrete policy implications of our wrestling match with 
textualist theory.  I mentioned favorably there a version of a codified 
economic substance doctrine proposed by the Senate but not enacted.  
I have left largely untouched the parallel proposal by the JCT.213  
Others have already pointed out the likely flaws in that version.214  
Our analysis here confirms those judgments.  The JCT’s plan would 
oblige a court to apply the JCT’s version of the doctrine only where a 
court first concludes that the doctrine applies.  That leaves textualist 
courts hostile to purposive interpretation free to ignore the doctrine.215  
note 114, at 141, 147–48. 
 212 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 55–56; Kennedy, supra note 39, at 
1687–88; Weisbach, supra note 38, at 247–48. 
 213 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14. 
 214 E.g., Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1948–49; Sheppard, supra note 
13, at 1025–26. 
 215 Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1949; Sheppard, supra note 13, at 
1025–26.  Unfortunately, the Senate’s proposal has this flaw, as well.  See Senate 
Finance Committee, Finance Committee Releases Summary of Tax Bill, 2005 TNT 
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At the same time, it continues — and probably adds to — existing 
doctrinal uncertainty about the applicability of the doctrine, which can 
only undermine any deterrence value Congress hopes to gain from 
codification.  And it leaves unresolved the problem that incomplete 
compliance with economic substance principles leaves other taxpayers 
demoralized.216
Finally, it is worth noting a few areas I have not addressed at all.  
For one thing, I have examined only the “demand” side of the tax 
planning business.  Certainly there is much that could be said and 
done about complementary rules for professional responsibility and 
attorney or other tax preparer disclosure.217  And my examination of 
penalty provisions, and the problems of the audit lottery generally, 
has been fairly cursory.  Thus, the reader should not infer that, in 
advocating for one formulation of the doctrine, I mean that there is 
nothing else to be done. 
 
221-23 (Nov. 17, 2005). 
 216 Ronald A. Pearlman, Demystifying Disclosure: First Steps, 55 TAX L. REV. 
289, 294 (2002). 
 217 See, e.g., Eustice, supra note 114, at 150–51, 163. 
